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ABSTRACT
This study investigates bidder behavior in road construction procurement 
auctions held by the Oklahoma Department o f  Transportation (ODOT) in the period 
January 1997 to August 2000. The first essay, “An Empirical Analysis o f Entrant and 
Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions,” deals with differences in bidding 
behavior between incumbent and entrant firms in procurement auctions. The study 
finds that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower 
bids than do incumbents. As a result, the forgone surplus is greater for entrants than 
for incumbents. The differences in bidding patterns are consistent with an 
asymmetric model o f auctions, in which the distribution o f  an entrant's costs exhibits 
greater dispersion than that o f  an incumbent. The characteristics o f rival bidders also 
have an effect on bidding behavior. The tougher the average rival, the lower the bid 
and the lower the winning bid.
The second essay. “Sequential Bidding in Road Construction Auctions." 
investigates differences in bidding patterns between morning and afternoon auctions. 
Empirical evidence from construction contracts suggests that prices are not 
statistically different between morning and afternoon sessions and that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the probability o f  submitting a bid between 
winners and losers o f  morning auctions. In afternoon auctions, a large part o f  the 
adjustment in bidding behavior is induced by additional asymmetries that arise due to 
release o f  information about prices and bids in morning auctions. As expected, the 
more competitive the set o f rivals a firm faces, the more aggressively it bids. Even 
though the difference in the probability o f  submitting a bid is not statistically
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significant between winners and losers o f  early auctions, losers make a much larger 
adjustment in their afternoon bids relative to winners.
In the third essay, “Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An 
Empirical Investigation,” 1 examine the impact o f synergies on bidder behavior in 
recurring road construction procurement auctions. The projects are spatially 
correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, their probability o f 
bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Further, firm 
efficiencies increase the probability o f bidding and winning, as does the 
aggressiveness o f  bids. Finally, a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more 
aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
I.l. Auctions
Auctions have entered the economics literature relatively recently, although they 
have been an integral part o f economic life for more than 2500 years.' McMillan (1994). 
Cramton (1997), Klemperer (1999), and Kagel and Levin (2001) identify the various 
organizations and contexts in which auctions play a predominant role today, including 
nontraditional commodities like radio spectrum licenses, electricity, and transport.
Vickrey (1961) first discussed the game-theoretic aspects o f auctions and made 
enormous progress in analyzing them theoretically. However, only after the 1970s did 
the practical, empirical, and theoretical aspects o f auctions begin to be studied in greater 
detail with critical contributions from Wilson (1977), Milgrom and Weber (1982a), 
Maskin and Riley (1984, 1985), and Samuelson (1986).
As Klemperer (1999), and Kagel and Levin (2001) point out, auctions are well- 
defined economic environments and can provide unique opportunities to test various 
economic theories, especially game theory, with incomplete information. Major 
empirical research efforts have focused on auctions for mineral rights, timber, and road 
construction. There has also been increasing interest in experimental work on auctions.' 
Chapter II o f this study provides a more extensive theoretical and empirical literature 
review o f  auction research.
' See C assady  ( 1967) fo r a  h isto ry  o f  auctions. 
■ See K agel and  Roth (1995).
1.2. Importance of the Study
Theoretical and empirical economists have explored, to some extent, asymmetries 
due to collusion, differences in information, and capacity constraints. However, 
empirical studies have not examined bidder behavior due to asymmetries caused by 
differences in experience with a focus on entrants and incumbents. Further, researchers 
have not considered learning as it arises from the release o f new information about 
winners and losers in a sequence o f auctions, nor have they looked at synergies gained by 
winning multiple projects in road construction auctions. In my thesis, I empirically 
investigate the bidding behavior o f firms due to these asymmetries using the Oklahoma 
Department o f  Transportation (ODOT) data on road construction project auctions. The 
data set utilized in this study allows for testing the validity o f several existing theoretical 
predictions regarding rivals, firm efficiency, and capacity constraints. In short, this study 
will fill several gaps in the literature on asymmetric auctions by empirically testing 
several existing theoretical predictions.
Most o f  the theoretical literature on auctions has investigated bidding behavior in 
two polar cases, private-value and common-value models. Some researchers have 
considered asymmetries among bidders in models focusing on differences in private 
costs.^ Other studies have investigated informational asymmetries in common-value 
auctions focusing on the value o f information and the winner's curse."^ One o f  the 
significant features o f this study is the incorporation o f  informational asymmetries in a 
model that retains the basic theoretical structure introduced by Maskin and Riley (2000b) 
but makes sufficient modifications to allow for private and common value components.
 ^ S ee L ebrun  (1999) and  M askin and R iley (2000a, 2000b).
* See M ilgrom  and  W eber (1982) and  E ngelbrech t-W iggans et al (1983).
Then, using a non-structural estimation procedure, this model investigates those 
asymmetries caused by differences in experience. I consider, at one extreme, the group 
o f  least experienced bidders (entrants) and compare their behavior to that o f  bidders with 
some experience (incumbents). The third chapter shows that entrants behave differently 
from incumbents. We attribute their behavior to the fact that entrants lack bidding 
experience (a private-value component) and information about the auction process (a 
common-value component). Understanding bidding behavior under these circumstances 
is important as entry or the threat o f entry can increase competition in auctions. 
Therefore, this chapter provides new insights into bidder behavior when bidders face 
asymmetries from private and common-value components.
The empirical literature on sequential auctions has focused mainly on the 
direction o f  expected prices. However, experience and learning have an important effect 
on these bidding patterns. Information that is released earlier auctions can significantly 
influence the behavior o f  bidders in subsequent auction sessions. In the fourth chapter, 1 
examine bidding behavior due to asymmetries in relation to the sequential nature o f 
auction markets. This type o f bidder heterogeneity has not been addressed in auction 
research. I examine the effect o f the release o f information on bidder behavior in road 
construction auctions.
When considering recurring auctions, McMillan (1994) and Cramton (1997) point 
to two major issues: extraction o f synergies between goods and more efficient 
distribution o f goods. Theoretical studies have shown that, in recurring auctions, bidders 
trying to acquire multiple objects are more aggressive in their bidding than those bidding
on single objects/ The empirical research on recurring procurement auctions shows that 
firms may experience geographic synergies when they win two or more adjacent projects 
and bidders trying to acquire multiple projects display more aggressive bidding 
behav ior/ Further, studies have also shown that project location has a significant 
influence on bidding behav ior/ Hence, in road construction contracts, asymmetries arise 
when firms win multiple projects or develop competitive advantages due to their 
familiarity with regional resource markets. The fifth chapter examines the effect o f such 
synergies in road construction procurement auctions and empirically tests the predictions 
o f  Jeitschko and Wolfstetter's (2001) theory.
1.3. Objectives of the Study
In spite o f  a large number o f empirical studies on auctions*, there are still many 
gaps, especially when considering asymmetric auctions. The bidding behavior o f  new 
entrants, the sequential nature o f auction settings, and synergies are some areas that 
empirical economists have not studied extensively. 1. therefore, examine these types of 
asymmetries in procurement auctions. Bidder asymmetry is defined as follows: (1) 
entrants, firms submitting a bid for the first time, and incumbents, firms who have 
submitted at least one bid; (2) firms that have won in the morning session and firms that 
have lost in the morning session; and (3) firms with synergies’’ and firms with no
* See K rishna and  R osenthal (1995), B ranco (1997), and  Jeitschko  and W olfste tter (2001).
* See G an d a l’s (1997), A usubel et al (1997), and R usco and  W alls (1999).
' See P orter and  Z ona ( 1999) and B ajari (2001 ).
“ See C h ap te r II for a m ore  com prehensive literature review .
’ In th is study, synerg ies a re  defined  as econom ic advantages tha t b idders ga in  through  com plem en tarities 
associated  w ith w inn ing  m ultip le  p ro jects in a  particu lar geographic area.
competitive a d v a n ta g e s T h re e  separate essays present analyses o f the bidding behavior 
o f  firms under the above circumstances.
1.4. Delimitation of the Study
Government contracts, like State o f Oklahoma Department o f  Transportation's 
(ODOT) road construction contracts, are typically awarded through procurement 
auctions. This study uses ODOT data for auctions held from January 1997 to August 
2000. These data are unique due to the variables they include such as plan-holder
information, engineers’ cost estimates, number o f  days to complete projects, locations o f
projects and firms, and winning firms and their locations, all o f  which are favorable to
realize the objectives o f this study.
1.5. Results of the Study
The third chapter, "An Empirical Analysis o f Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in 
Road Construction Auctions,” deals with differences in bidding behavior between 
incumbent and entrant firms in procurement auctions." The results indicate that entrants 
bid and win more aggressively compared to incumbents. As a result, entrants tend to 
leave more 'money on the table’ compared to incumbents. Further, entrants' costs 
exhibit greater dispersion than incumbents' costs, a finding that is consistent with an 
asymmetric model o f auctions. Finally, the results indicate that, when firms face tougher 
rivals, they tend to bid and win aggressively.
A firm  m ay have  econom ic advantages (no  com petitive advantages) due to b idder’s fam iliarity  (lack  o f  
fam iliarity) w ith  local m arket resources, and  inherent firm effic iencies (ineffic iencies).
"  T his chap te r is based  on u .c w ork ing  paper entitled “A n E m pirical A nalysis o f  E ntran t and  Incum bent 
B idd ing  in R oad C onstruction  A uctions,” w ritten  in co llaboration  w ith  T im othy  D unne and  G eorgia 
K osm opoulou.
The fourth chapter, “Sequential Bidding in Road Construction Auctions,” 
investigates differences in bidding patterns between morning and afternoon auctions.'" 
This chapter demonstrates that construction contract prices are not statistically different 
between morning and afternoon sessions and that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the probability o f submitting a bid in the afternoon by morning winners and 
losers. Even though the difference in the probability o f submitting a bid is not 
statistically significant between winners and losers o f early auctions, losers make a much 
larger adjustment in their afternoon bids relative to winners. This bidding behavior is 
induced by the additional asymmetries that arise due to the release o f information about 
prices and bids in morning auctions. Similar to the findings in the first essay, the second 
essay also suggests that firms tend to bid more aggressively when they face tougher 
rivals.
The fifth chapter. “Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical 
Investigation,” empirically investigates the impact o f synergies and competitive 
advantages (or no-advantages) on bidder behavior in recurring road construction 
procurement auctions. This chapter reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When 
bidders with synergies or competitive advantages participate in procurement auctions, 
their probability o f bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. 
Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more 
aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.
'■ T his chap te r is based on  the p ap e r en titled  “Sequential B idding in Road C onstruction  A u c tio n s ,"  w ritten  
in co llaboration  w ith T im othy  D unne and  G eo rg ia  K osm opoulou that is fo rthcom ing  in E conom ics L etters
1.6. Organization of the Study
Chapter II presents a summary o f the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
pertaining to auctions. Chapter III presents the first essay, ‘‘An Empirical Analysis o f 
Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions.” Chapter IV presents the 
second essay, “Sequential Bidding in Road Construction Auctions.” The third essay. 
"Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation,” is presented 
in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI lays out a summary o f the study and suggests possible 
extensions o f this line o f  research. In the next chapter, I summarize the theoretical and 
empirical literature pertaining to this study.
(2002).
CHAPTER II 
AUCTION LITERATURE 
II I. Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the landmark theoretical and empirical 
studies o f  auctions with a focus on the bidding behavior due to asymmetries. Section 11.2 
introduces the standard types o f auctions that provide the conceptual background for this 
study. Section II.3 describes the basic models o f auctions on which auction research is 
based. Section 11.4 outlines the theoretical literature, and Section 11.5 examines the 
empirical literature on auctions.
II.2. Standard Auction Types
There are four basic types o f  auctions: 1) ascending-bid auctions, also called 
open, oral, or English auctions; 2) descending-bid auctions, also called Dutch auctions; 3) 
first-price sealed-bid auctions; and 4) second-price sealed-bid auctions. What follows is 
a description o f their rules in terms of single-object auctions. McAfee and McMillan 
( 1987) discuss these rules in greater detail.
In English auctions, the price is raised until a single bidder remains. In these 
auctions, the seller may announce the prices, the bidders may call out prices themselves, 
or bids may be submitted electronically with the highest current bid posted (e-Bay 
auctions). In Dutch auctions (used to sell flowers for export in the Netherlands), an 
auctioneer initially calls for a very high price and then continuously lowers it until a 
bidder stops the auction and claims the object for that price. In first-price sealed-bid 
auctions, each bidder independently submits a single bid without observing others' bids.
The object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. In procurement auctions, 
however, the lowest bidder wins the object. In second-price sealed-bid auctions, 
commonly called Vickery auctions after the theorist who first analyzed them in 19 6 1, the 
highest bidder claims the object but pays only the amount o f the second-highest bid.
II.3. Basic Models of Auctions
Information is a crucial element o f auction theory (Klemperer 1999). Each 
player’s best strategy is a function o f  his own information, and he tries to maximize his 
payoff conditional upon other players’ strategies and his beliefs about their information. 
Accordingly, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is best suited to such theory. Depending 
upon the information gathering process o f bidders, there are two polar cases: private- 
value'^ and common-value auctions.
In most auctions, there are both private-value and common-value components. 
For example, bidders for antiques may want to buy them for their own pleasure (a 
private-value element) but they may also bid for investment and eventual resale (a 
common-value element) (Milgrom and Weber 1982a). Therefore, analyzing these 
auctions becomes somewhat complicated even though they are well-defined economic 
environments. Hence, when analyzing auctions, theorists tend to emphasize these polar 
cases for ease in exposition.
In priva te-value  m odels, every  b idder va lues the ob jec t p rivately  and independently  o f  o ther b idders.
In com m on-value m odels, the value o f  the ob ject is sam e fo r all b idders but they are unaw are  o f  its actual 
v a lue  w hen  preparing  to subm it bids. A key  feature o f  com m on-value auctions is the possib ility  o f  
“w in n e r’s curse .” A nother b idder’s inform ation  m ay help  a b idder to determ ine m ore accu ra te ly  the  value 
o f  the ob jec t being  auctioned . This in form ation  can be ‘g o o d ’ o r bad’ and  the indiv idual w ho w ins the 
auction  often does not take into account the  fact tha t w inn ing  im plies tha t he has the m ost op tim istic  
estim ate  and, as a result, faces w inner’s curse.
II.4. Theoretical Literature
This section outlines some o f the theoretical literature on auctions that form the 
theoretical framework for this study, particularly those concepts that impinge upon bidder 
behavior contingent upon asymmetries. First, asymmetric information models with 
private values are outlined. Then, common-value auction models are described in terms 
o f asymmetries. Finally, recurring auction models are considered.
Private-Value Models
The literature on asymmetries in private-value auctions is considerably smaller 
than that on symmetric auctions. Recently, Lebrun (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000a. 
2000b) have shown that differences in private costs will shape the bidding distribution 
function. Maskin and Riley (2000b) say that these cost asymmetries can arise due to 
different technologies and managerial efficiencies. They define ‘strong' bidders as those 
who are very efficient, and 'w eak ' bidders as those who are less efficient. To be more 
precise, the cost distribution o f a strong bidder is skewed to the right relative to that o f  the 
weak bidder. They show that, in this case, a bidder o f  any kind who faces a 'strong' 
bidder tends to bid more aggressively and, when facing a 'w eak ' bidder, tends to bid less 
aggressively.
Common-Value Models
Milgrom and Weber (1982a) show that, in common value models, a bidder's 
expected profit depends more on the privacy o f his information than on its accuracy. 
Moreover, even if  a bidder makes unbiased estimates o f  the true value o f an object, the 
winner will find that he faces the winner's curse. In common-value auctions with an 
infinite number o f  bidders, the price will converge to tlie true value o f the object
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(Klemperer 1999). Further, Milgrom and Weber (1982a) and Engelbrecht-W iggans, 
Milgrom, and Weber (1983) consider informational asymmetries in a common-value 
auctions setting and show that ‘informed’ bidders are less likely to face the w inner's
curse.
Levin and Smith (1994) show that, when considering endogenous entry with 
symmetric information, a seller should charge an entry fee or a reservation price (socially 
optimal) to maximize revenues. Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2001) consider 
endogenous entry with asymmetric information (unlike Levin and Smith’s results) and 
argue that social planners should not discourage entry.
Recurring Auctions
Equilibrium models o f recurring auctions have appeared in the literature only 
recently. Two concerns in recurring auctions are bidders' extraction o f synergies 
between goods and enhanced efficiency in the distribution o f goods (McMillan. 1994 and 
Cramton, 1997). Motivated by these concerns. Krishna and Rosenthal (1995) and Branco 
(1997) show that, in recurring auctions, bundle bidders who bid on multiple objects bid 
more aggressively than unit bidders who bid on a single object. Jeitschko and Wolfstetter 
(2001) have described the bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid ascending recurring 
auctions. They show that previous winners may experience synergies in subsequent 
auctions. These auctions can also be viewed as a special case o f  affiliated auctions since 
bids may be correlated due to synergies and recurrence.
II.5. Empirical Literature
In this section, some asymmetric empirical studies are presented. The results of 
asymmetric private-value auctions and asymmetric common-value auctions are
I I
discussed. Some o f the empirical results on road construction procurement auctions and 
recurring auctions are also considered.
Asymmetric Independent Private-Value Models
Considering asymmetric empirical independent private-value models, Meyer 
(1993) performed an experiment and found that market size is inversely related to the size 
o f the entry fee, and that agents enter the auction until the average profitability equals or 
is less than the entry fee. Maskin and Riley (2000b) have provided examples to show 
that, with asymmetry, revenue equivalence no longer holds and that, under different 
assumptions about the nature o f the heterogeneity, expected revenue in high-bid auctions 
might be higher or lower than in open auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) 
have presented evidence o f declining price patterns from data on cattle auctions. They 
have shown that prices decline over the course o f the auction, with the steepest decline 
toward the end. These results are consistent with a simple model o f sequential auctions 
o f goods with independent private values.
Asymmetric Common-Value Models
Considering asymmeunc empirical common-value models, Hendricks et al (1987), 
using data from federal auctions o f  drainage leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (CCS), 
examined asymmetries caused by differing levels o f information, competition, and 
profits, and the validity o f existing theoretical predictions o f Wilson (1977), Weverbergh 
(1979), and Englebercht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983). They have shown that 
competition increases with an increase in the number o f  bidders, that profits were higher 
on tracts won by informed bidders and that iminformed bidders tend to face the w inner's 
curse. Hendricks and Porter (1988), using CCS data, found that neighboring firms had
better information about the value o f an oil-lease than non-neighboring firms. Further, 
they showed that both types o f firms bid strategically in accordance with the Bayesian- 
Nash equilibrium. One o f their key findings was that neighbors and non-neighbors had 
different means but the same variances in their cost distributions.'^
Kagel and Levin (1999) investigated common-value auctions with bidders having 
access to insider information. Each experimental session consisted o f  a series o f auctions 
in which the highest bidder received a single unit o f a commodity. They found that the 
presence o f an insider or informed bidder does not preclude the winner’s curse compared 
to symmetric common-value auctions. In contrast, the behavior o f experienced bidders, 
who have largely overcome the winner's curse, fits the theoretical predictions o f 
equilibrium bidding theory, namely: 1) average seller’s revenue is larger with an 
informed bidder or insider than in symmetric information structure auctions; 2) insiders 
make greater profits, conditional on winning, than uninformed bidders or outsiders; and 
3) insiders increase their bids in response to more rivals.
Many empirical studies have assumed the number o f bidders exogenous to the 
model. Entry is typically endogenous and, for many auctions, the actual number o f  
participants is neither known ex ante nor deterministic. Further, many bidders incur costs 
when submitting bids due to acquisition o f  private information and bid preparation. 
McAfee and Vincent (1992) addressed this problem in their study o f US offshore oil 
auctions. They assumed an asymmetric information common-value model with 
endogenous entry and constructed a non-structural model that enabled them to calculate 
the optimal reservation price.
H endricks e t a! (1999) using O C S data  show  that the existence o f  w in n er’s curse and  that the  b idders are 
aw are  o f  its presence and  bids accord ing ly . In th is study  they  assum e a sym m etric  com m on value m odel.
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Paarsch (1997) also recognized the importance o f  accounting for endogenous 
entry. He took great care to identify the set o f  potential bidders in a timber sale auction. 
He accounted for the cost o f  those who did not bid because they found the reservation 
price too high. Further, Bajari and Hortacsu (2000) studied the features o f online bidding 
and selling behavior by using a data set consisting o f e-Bay coin auctions. They also 
used a common-values model with endogenous entry. They found that bidders’ expected 
profits decrease as the number o f bidders increase and entry cost is a key feature in 
understanding observed bidding patterns.
Road Construction Procurement Auctions
When considering road construction procurement auctions. Porter and Zona 
(1993, 1999) examined bidding in auctions for state highway construction contracts to 
determine the occurrence o f bid rigging. They proposed a multinomial logit model to 
detect the presence o f such rigging on the basis o f which they found that there was 
evidence o f collusion and cartel activity.
In an earlier study, Feinstein et al (1985) looked at the cartel behavior o f  highway 
contractors in North Carolina. They assumed that costs were stochastic and projects 
awarded in adjacent periods were substitutes for one another. The empirical evidence 
suggested that cartels do, in fact, attempt to misinform purchasers in addition to raising 
the minimum bid on specific projects.
Thiel (1988), examining auctions o f highway construction contracts by state 
governments, found no evidence o f  the winner’s curse. He assumed that the state 
engineer’s estimated cost o f fulfilling the contract is an unbiased estimate o f the true
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value. However, Levin and Smith (1991) showed that Thiel’s equilibrium bidding 
strategies were mis-specified and that the results were not reliable.
Deltas (1996) examined highway construction contracts in the State of 
Connecticut. He applied a structural estimation procedure to show that the lognormal 
distribution is a better approximation to the distribution o f contractor costs as compared 
to a uniform distribution or exponential distributions.
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (1999), using a similar two-stage approach as that of 
Elyakime et al (1994) and Guerre et al (2000), investigated bidding behavior in highway 
procurement contracts in California. In the first stage, they estimated the beliefs of 
bidders concerning the bids o f other bidders. The estimate included bidder asymmetr>', 
contract characteristics, and state variables. In the second stage, they inferred privately 
known costs using a structural relationship. Based on the model, they estimated cost 
parameters and examined equilibrium bid functions. They found that bidders that have 
large fractions o f their capacity committed have, on average, a higher cost than bidders 
with little capacity committed. When all bidders are capacity constrained, the resulting 
low bid is higher than when all bidders are unconstrained.
Recurring Procurement Auctions
Empirical research on recurring procurement auctions with synergies is scarce. 
Gandal (1997)'^ and Ausubel et al (1997)'^ show that there are geographic synergies 
associated with winning multiple adjacent projects. Rusco and Walls (1999) show that, 
in repeated spatially correlated timber auctions, bidders bidding in multiple projects bid
“  T h is study  investigates the Israeli C A T V  licenses.
T h is study  investigates the ex istence o f  synergies in b roadband personal com m unication  service 
spectrum  (PC S) auctions in U nited  States.
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more aggressively. Further, Porter and Zona (1999) and Bajari (2001),'^ have also shown 
that location plays a major role in a firm’s bidding behavior.
II.6. Conclusion
This chapter has presented some o f the crucial findings in the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on auctions. Empirical studies have investigated asymmetries 
due to information, capacity constraints, collusion, and geographic advantages.
T his study  investigates the b idding by highw ay construction  firm s for p rocurem en t con trac ts in 
C alifornia.
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CHAPTER III 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENTRANT AND INCUMBENT BIDDING 
IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION AUCTIONS
III.l. Introduction
This chapter compares the bidding patterns o f entrant and incumbent firms in road 
construction auctions held by ODOT between January 1997 and August 2000. In any 
market, entrants or the threat o f entry should act to increase competition. The benefits of 
competition can be even greater in procurement auctions where, in practice, there is a 
considerable history o f  collusion.'^ Larger participation can substantially reduce the 
returns o f any bidding ring. However, entering firms may be at a significant 
disadvantage relative to incumbents in these auctions. Entrants may face higher 
uncertainty in the development o f a bid as they lack bidding and production experience. 
They may also have access to less information than incumbent bidders regarding the 
pricing and cost o f various bid components. Such asymmetries have not been studied 
empirically.
The theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions has explored aspects o f bidding 
behavior in common- and private-value models. The earlier work of Milgrom and Weber 
(1982a) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al (1983) considers informational asymmetries in a 
common-value setting with emphasis on the value o f information and the winner's curse. 
Recently, Marshall et al (1995), Lebrun (1999), and Maskin and Riley (2000a, 2000b) 
explore properties o f bidding distributions focusing on differences in private costs that 
shape the form o f the distribution function. Since there is little theoretical work on
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asymmetric auction models relative to their symmetric counterparts, some key results 
from this literature are presented. Then, concentrating on the behavior o f entrants and 
incumbents in auctions, differences in the bidding distributions, through a model that 
introduces common- and private-cost components, are identified. The framework 
accommodates informational asymmetries due to a differential level o f  experience and 
efficiency and provides some explanation for the observed patterns.
In a common-value framework, Milgrom and Weber (1982b) show that the larger 
the informational gap that is known to exist among bidders, the more severe the problem 
o f the winner's curse. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al (1983) analyze a setting in which a 
bidder has private information about the common value o f  an object that is not available 
to the rest o f the bidders. In a private-value framework, Lebrun (1999) and Maskin and 
Riley (2000a, 2000b) concentrate on asymmetries that could arise as a result o f 
differences in private costs. These asymmetries can create advantages likely to justify 
stochastic dominance in the distribution o f values. Empirical evidence supporting these 
theoretical results is presented. However, differences that are due to experience with 
emphasis on the behavior o f  entrants are emphasized. The distribution o f  cost estimates 
o f an entrant, as a firm with no experience, exhibits a larger dispersion and is unlikely to 
preserve the property o f stochastic dominance for all possible values. Nevertheless, if  the 
property o f stochastic dominance still holds for low values o f the cost, the frequency o f 
low bids will be larger for entrants than for incumbents.
The empirical literature on asymmetries in auctions has separately explored 
differences in information available to bidders and differences in private costs.
See. for exam ple, the work by Porter and Zona (19 )3 ) and Bajari (2000) for analyses o f  bid-rigging and collusive 
behavior in procurem ent auctions.
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Hendricks and Porter (1988) examine the role of asymmetric information among bidders 
in Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) drainage lease auctions. They find that informed 
bidders (bidders that neighbor a particular tract) earn higher profits in drainage lease 
auctions and interpret their findings as being in concordance with predictions o f  models 
o f common-value auctions with asymmetric information. A more recent paper by Jofre- 
Bonet and Pesendorfer (1999, 2000) examines asymmetries in bidding behavior for 
highway procurement contracts in California. This work focuses on asymmetries in costs 
due to differences in backlogs. They find that bidders that have large fractions o f  their 
capacity committed have, on average, higher cost than bidders with little committed 
capacity. When all bidders are capacity constrained, the resulting low bid is higher than 
that when all bidders are unconstrained. In both cases, asymmetries lead to differences in 
bidding behavior across firms and lead to differences in auction outcomes.
In this study, asymmetries between incumbent bidders and entrant bidders are 
examined. Entrant bidders can differ from incumbent bidders in a number o f  respects. 
Entrants may have less experience than incumbent bidders in production. They may be 
less certain o f their own costs for completing a given project than incumbents, or they 
may have less information about the procurement auction process. Alternatively, 
incumbents facing entrants may be faced with a potential bidder they know little about 
and, hence, incumbent bidding may be influenced by the presence o f entrants. This essay 
documents differences in the bidding patterns and the winning bids between entrants and 
incumbents. The results reveal that entrants generally bid more aggressively than 
incumbent bidders and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. 
Moreover, when entrants win auctions, they have a tendency to leave more money on the
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table than incumbents. That is, the difference between the winning bid and the second 
lowest bid is, on average, greater when an entrant wins an auction than when an 
incumbent does. Finally, our data provides an opportunity to test some o f the theoretical 
claims by Maskin and Riley (2000b) and reveals that bidders who face tougher rivals 
(rivals with proven past wins) bid more aggressively and, generally, win with a lower bid.
The remainder o f the chapter is organized as follows. Section III.2 describes the 
modeling framework. Section I1I.3 provides a description o f the data, while Section 1II.4 
reports the results. Section III.5 provides some summary comments.
1II.2. Modeling Framework
Consider a first-price sealed bid auction in which two risk neutral bidders'" 
compete for a government contract. The cost o f the contract (c,) to bidder / is drawn from 
a known distribution (F/) with support {cl. c//]. F  is twice continuously differentiable and 
has a density (/J) that is strictly positive on the support. Each firm chooses a bid (6) to 
maximize its expected profit 
K ,{b x ,)  = { b - c , ) { \ - F , { b ] \ b ) \
where bj''{b) is / s  inverse bid function. LeBrun (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000a. 
2000b) have shown*' that, when bidder types are distributed independently, in 
equilibrium the bid functions are increasing and differentiable so that, for each firm /. an 
inverse exists and is differentiable. Thereafter, in this study let b[‘{b)= 4  (6).
■° In this chapter, we differentiate betw een groups o f  bidders with em phasis on entrants and incum bents. T hat is why 
the sim plifying assum ption o f  two bidders (which one can think o f  as two groups o f  bidders) is appropriate.
*' T heir results are describing a fram ework in which the bidder with the highest value w ins the auction. W e are m aking 
here the appropriate changes in the objective function and the conclusions to fit the fram ework o f  construction 
contracts.
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The equilibrium to this model can be characterized as the solution to a system o f 
differential equations with boundary conditions. This solution is unique and constitutes a 
pair o f inverse bid functions. In particular, for each / (% '):
(III.l)
where every ^  (b) is evaluated at b for all b in [6.. b']. These differential equations 
should satisfy the following boundary conditions:
P', (6. )) = 0,
(III.2)
b'  V j .
If the distribution o f private costs of one bidder stochastically dominates the 
distribution o f private costs o f the other, then bidding carries the qualitative properties o f 
the results in Maskin and Riley (2000b). Notice that a distribution {Fj firs t order) 
stochastically dominates another distribution (F/) if  and only if  F,{c) > Fj{c) for all values 
o f  the cost (c). Stochastic dominance is likely in an environment in which the 
opportunity cost o f completing a project is different for various contractors. This 
opportunity cost depends partially on the technology available and the level o f 
managerial efficiency. Maskin and Riley show (in their Proposition 3.3) that, if  the 
distribution o f private costs o f a "weak" bidder stochastically dominates the distribution 
o f  private costs of a "strong" bidder^*, the equilibrium bid distribution o f  a weak bidder 
stochastically dominates that o f a strong bidder. Proposition 3.5 o f the same paper 
establishes that: 1) a strong bidder will submit a bid that is further above his cost 
compared to a weak bidder, 2) if a weak bidder faces a strong bidder rather than another
”  Evidence o f  strength can be provided by looking at the ratio o f  past wins relative to the num ber o f  bids subm itted.
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weak bidder, he will bid more aggressively (closer to his true valuation), and 
symmetrically, and 3) if  a strong bidder faces a weak bidder rather than another strong 
bidder he will bid less aggressively"^. In Section III.4, empirical evidence is provided 
that is consistent with some o f  these predictions, using two measures o f strength. The 
one is a measure o f  toughness that captures the efficiency of opponents, and the other is a 
measure that captures a firm's o’ato efficiency. The regression results presented in Table 
3 indicate that bidders who face stronger opponents bid more aggressively, on average, as 
Maskin and Riley (2000b) suggest in Proposition 3.5. They also provide some evidence 
to support Proposition 3.3: more efficient firms bid more aggressively on average.
These results can be generalized to create a more realistic model in which the cost 
o f the contract (c,) to bidder / exhibits both private and common value characteristics. 
When bidders receive multiple signals, they must combine different pieces o f  information 
into a summary statistic. With a few exceptions, auction theory has restricted attention to 
cases were private information has one dimension. Consideration o f multidimensional 
types poses substantial technical difficulties with the most important being the 
establishment o f existence at some level o f generality. At the core o f this problem is the 
ability to order signals in multiple dimensions. One environment in which this study can 
provide a solution is the following: Suppose that bidder / makes an estimate o f his private 
cost (//,) and receives a signal (j,) which is an unbiased estimate o f  the common cost (S). 
The estimates o f the private cost and the signals o f the common cost are independently 
distributed across bidders. Let C/=as/+t,+(/-a)i^ s /{n-l)  be the total estimated cost o f  a
^  Proposition 3.3. in fact, also establishes that when an inexperienced bidder faces an experienced b idder rather than 
another inexperienced bidder he responds with a m ore aggressive bidding distribution in the sense o f  stochastic 
dom inance, and sym m etrically, when an experienced bidder faces an inexperienced bidder rather than another 
experienced bidder he responds with a  less aggressive bid distribution.
->->
contract to bidder where <yis a way to parameterize the degree o f uncertainty that a 
bidder faces in the calculation o f  the common cost. The parameter a  is common 
knowledge to all bidders. In a purely private-value model, a  = \. In an affiliated 
environment, in which bidders symmetrically view the common component, a- = 0. In 
order to ensure monotonicity and existence within this framework, one must assume that 
the densities o f  the tîs  and the s^’s  are log-concave.^^ Goeree and Offerman (1999) 
derived the equilibrium bidding functions in the symmetric case. The appendix extends 
this analysis to asymmetric auctions. This study derives a pair o f inverse bid functions 
similar to (1), with the only difference being that F/ is now the distribution o f  the 
combined signal {a  s, + //) that bidder / receives. The result that follows can thus be 
established in this more general framework.
I1I.3. Characterization of the Equilibrium Bid Distribution of Entrants and
Incumbents
This section addresses the influence o f the lack o f bid-placing experience on the 
behavior o f entrants (bidders with no prior bidding experience). The distribution o f  cost 
estimates for entrant firms is expected to exhibit a much greater dispersion, on average, 
relative to that of incumbents, reflecting an increased uncertainty caused by the lack o f 
experience and greater variation in managerial efficiency. As a result, it may not satisfy 
stochastic dominance for every value o f cost, and the characterization o f relative bids by 
Maskin and Riley (2000b) may no longer apply. In such an environment, it is not 
possible to establish differences in bidding patterns that do not depend upon the 
parameters o f the distributions o f  cost estimates. Nevertheless, the stochastic relation
For m ore details on this m odeling fram ework and a  discussion o f  Its advantages see Bikhchandani and R ile) ( 1991). 
A lberts and Harstad (1991). Vincent ( 1995), K lem perer ( 1998). Bulow, Huang and K lem perer ( 1999). and G oeree and 
O fferm an (1999).
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among distributions for low values o f the estimated cost could enable predictions o f 
bidding patterns at the low end o f the distribution. The following proposition shows that, 
if  the distribution o f  cost estimates o f entrants stochastically dominates that o f 
incumbents, entrants will bid more aggressively relative to their cost estimates than 
incumbents in the neighborhood o f b* and vice versa. If  the distribution o f  estimates o f 
incumbents stochastically dominates that o f entrants, incumbents will bid more 
aggressively relative to their cost estimates.
P roposition: If < f i ^ ib * ) )  then ésib) > <^ib) for any b e  [by b*+e].
Conversely, if fsi^iib*)) > fi^ ib> ))  then <z>£(è) < ^ ib )  for any b e  [6«. b*+é\.
Proof: This study will first prove that ifyK<z^X^*)) </X<z^ X^ *)) then <^ y{b)> é ih )  for any b 
E  [6*. b*+e\. Since the lower bound o f the distribution is the same for both bidders, 
^ib>) = Further, fe iM b .) )  < fi{^i{b>)) implies that Fe(x ) < Fi(x) in the right
neighborhood of 
From the equilibrium condition:
f , {</>,:(b.))_ ■ ^ ------- 1-------^ --------!--------= (b. (III.3)
It follows from (2) and (3) that ^i(b>) < <z%(6*). Therefore, in the neighborhood o f b«, 
< ^E(b). The second part o f the statement can be proved following similar 
arguments. OED
The greater uncertainty an entrant faces in practice, when he estimates the cost, 
implies that an incumbent's distribution o f estimates stochastically dominates that o f  an 
entrant's estimates for low values. Taking into account the differences among the 
estimated distributions o f costs in the two groups, an incumbent with a low estimate o f
*■' Many com m only used densities such as the uniform, norm al, chi-square and exponential densities satisfy this
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the cost will bid more aggressively than an entrant. Strategic considerations o f 
incumbents will induce more aggressive bidding relative to their estimate, to compensate 
for the anticipated behavior o f entrants. However, aggressive bidding relative to one's 
cost estimate does not imply necessarily aggressive bidding relative to the engineering 
estimate. In fact, since ^ib<) = and feif^iib-)) > fj((^i(b*)), it follows by continuity
that, in the neighborhood of b*, the distribution o f bids o f  entrants stochastically 
dominates that o f incumbents."^ In other words, due to larger dispersion in the estimates, 
entrants will bid more aggressively relative to the engineering estimates. If Fs{x) is much 
larger than Fi{x) around c/.., the occurrence o f low bids (for example in the lowest 10th or 
25th percentile o f all bids) is expected to be much greater for entrants than for 
incumbents and entrants will face more o f the winner's curse.
More experienced bidders, on the other hand, are expected to be less uncertain 
about their costs and more efficient on average. There are two reasons why they should 
be more efficient. First, subcontractors tend to make different deals with different 
bidders and experience seems to be a natural instrument for differentiation. Second, the 
bidders that continue to bid in the long run are likely to be the most efficient, on average. 
However, since the variance o f the distribution o f estimated values as well as the level of 
efficiency are expected to differ among bidders with different levels o f bidding 
experience, there is still more ambiguity as to the stochastic relation across distributions 
o f  the estimated costs for those bidders. Empirical observations on the behavior o f  firms 
with varied levels o f experience conform to these expectations. The average bids are not 
monotonically decreasing in the level o f experience.
assum ption.
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III.4. Data
The data used in our analysis comes from ODOT and contains information on all 
road construction projects offered for bid letting by the State o f Oklahoma from January 
1997 to August 2000. These projects include road construction and paving projects, 
traffic signal projects, bridge construction and maintenance projects, as well as smaller 
drainage and clearance type projects.*’ Projects are auctioned o ff on a monthly basis and 
the state uses a sealed-bid auction where the lowest bid is awarded the contract. The state 
may reject the lowest bid when it is 7% above the state’s engineering cost estimate for the 
project.’® For most projects, individual bidders must be pre-qualified. Pre-qualification 
involves the submission o f certified financial statements to ODOT. The pre-qualification 
process determines the size o f the projects a firm can bid on and is related to the level of 
working capital available to the firm and its past success rate in completing projects. 
Firms can be removed from the pre-qualification list if  they fail to complete contracts 
successfully. Finally, bidders must include a payment o f 5% o f  the value o f the project 
on submission o f  the bid.’^
The above auction data includes information on the identity o f the firms that 
purchase plans for a project—the “plan-holders”, the identity and the bids o f  all bidders 
for a project, and the winning bid (if the contract is awarded). Hence, this study has 
information on the set o f firms considering making a bid, the bidders, and the winner for 
each project. Further, the state provides the location o f  each project, a description o f the
Vlaskin and Riley (2000b) have shown that this is true if  the stochastic relation is extended to the entire support o f 
types.
■ H ighway construction auctions have been exam ined in a  num ber o f  papers including Thiel (1988). Porter and Zona 
(1993). Jofre-B onet and Pesendorfer ( 1999) and Bajari (2000).
’* T here have been som e exceptions to this rule mostly due to underestim ation o f  the cost by the state.
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project (e.g., bridge construction, asphalt paving, etc.), the details o f  the project (e.g., the 
length and depth o f the paving surface, the type o f  asphalt or concrete product to utilize, 
the amount o f  excavation, etc.), the duration o f the project (calendar days), and the 
engineering estimate o f  the project’s total cost. Table 1 provides summary statistics on 
the number o f  auctions, the average number o f plan-holders per auction, and the average 
number o f  bidders per auction. During the period o f analysis, there were 1736 auctions 
with an average o f  5.7 plan-holders and 3.3 bidders per auction. O f the 1736 auctions. 
1411 were awarded contracts. A total o f 284 different firms held plans while 218 firms 
bid on projects and 144 different firms won contracts.^°
A specific definition o f entry is used to distinguish between entering and 
incumbent firms. This study divides the sample o f  auctions into two periods— January 
1997 to June 1998, and July 1998 to August 2000. The first period is used to identify 
incumbent bidders. Any firm that bids during the period January 1997 through June 1998 
is considered an incumbent during the July 1998 to August 2000 period. A firm bidding 
for the first time in the July 1998 to August 2000 period is considered an entrant. If  that 
firm bids again in the August 1998 to August 2000 period, it is classified as incumbent. 
The third column o f Table 1 reports auction statistics for the period July 1998 through 
August 2000. This sub-sample is comprised o f  952 auctions. There were 5.7 plan­
holders and about 3.2 bidders on average in each auction. Thus, the bidding statistics 
look quite similar in the sub-sample as compared to the overall period. Entrants make up
In general, these requirem ents establish som e barriers to  entry for new firms. Firm s m ust have sufficient liquidity to 
post a bond, they m ust provide audited financial accounts and they arc limited to bidding on certain size projects based 
on their working capital.
T here are several firms in our d a ta  sets that purchase plans, bid and win frequently. The m axim um  num ber o f  bids 
we observe by one firm is 219 and the m axim um  num ber o f  wins by a firm is 60 wins.
”  W e verified the robustness o f  o u r results to the choice o f  entry threshold by dividing the tim e period in a  d ifle ren t 
fashion. We defined as incum bent any firm that appeared in 1997 o r 1998 and defined entrants in the 1999-2000 time 
period. The results that follow are consistent across both definitions.
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a relatively small number o f plan-holders and bidders. O f the 5427 plans purchased in 
that period, entrants (who eventually submitted 71 bids) purchased only 185. However, 
the number o f  auctions with entrants is somewhat higher: out o f  the 952 auctions under 
study, 140 contain entrants.
Figure 1 presents the bids (normalized by the project engineering cost estimates) of 
entrants versus incumbent b i d d e r s . A  low relative bid represents an aggressive bid in 
this figure. The mean relative bid across all auctions in the period July 1998 to August 
2000 is 1.118. Figure 1 shows that entrants place more aggressive relative bids than 
incumbents. This is particularly true at the lower tail o f  the distribution. The picture 
suggests that greater variation in managerial efficiency and increased uncertainty caused 
by the lack o f  experience o f entrants can increase the likelihood o f  low bids. While 
Figure 1 suggests that entrants place a larger number o f low bids, this finding should be 
interpreted cautiously because there are. as yet. no controls for differences in project 
types, the numbers o f  competitors, or the characteristics o f  rivals faced by bidders. The 
next section presents some basic regression models that have been used to describe the 
differences between entrant and incumbent bidders more fully.
III.5. Empirical Analysis
This section presents differences in bidding between entrants and incumbents. As 
discussed previously, the distribution o f entrants’ bids may be considerably more 
dispersed than those o f  incumbents due to the higher level o f uncertainty that entrants 
face. This may influence entrants, vis-à-vis incumbents, in two ways. First, greater 
uncertainty may result in entrants winning some auctions with very low bids (i.e.. very
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aggressive bids). Second, greater uncertainty may result in some entrant winners leaving 
more money on the table. In both cases, entrants may incur greater losses because they 
have greater uncertainty regarding the costs o f carrying out a specific project. 
.Alternatively, it is not clear how average entrant bids will differ from incumbent bids. 
These issues are examined below with a simple reduced-form model o f bidding in a 
procurement auction. The basic structure o f  the regression model is as follows 
6
y . = P ^ + Y ^ P j  Py, + Pi \og{engest, ) + log(# bidders, )
/= !
Pc,Entry, + + P^j^RWP, +£,.
Three dependent variables that summarize the bidding patterns in these auctions are 
studied: 1) log o f the bid, 2) log o f the winning bid, and 3) the money left on the table. 
Two different measures o f the money left on the table are employed. In the first instance, 
the money left on the table variable is measured as the proportional difference between 
the lowest and the second lowest bid when there are multiple bidders. In the case o f a 
single bidder, the money left on the table variable is constructed as the proportional 
difference between the winning bid and the reserve price. In the second case, this study 
constructs the money left on the table variable as the lesser o f the difference between the 
lowest and second lowest bid or the lowest bid and the reserve price. The reserve price is 
constructed based on the state’s reserve rule that sets the reserve at 7% above the 
engineering cost estimate.
The independent variables include controls for project characteristics (P/s and 
log(engest)), the number o f  bidders (log(#bidders)), the characteristics o f  the bidders
Figure 2 p resen ts a kernel density  d is tribu tions o f  relative b ids fo r tw o g roups o f  b idders. T he  b idders 
w ith the least experience  (low est quartile ) are com pared to the b idders w ith  th e  m ost experience  (up p er 
quartile  o f  experience).
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(Entry and WB), and the characteristics o f the rivals in each auction (IB and ARWP). 
The project characteristics include the state’s estimate o f the engineering cost 
(log(engest)) and a set o f  dummy variables for project types (P/s). The engineering cost 
estimates are constructed by the state by pricing each feature outlined in the design and 
then deriving an overall cost estimate for the project. A set o f six dummy variables are 
used to control for broad classes o f project types— asphalt paving, clearance and bank 
protection, bridge work, grading and draining, concrete work, signals and lighting. The 
omitted group is miscellaneous work such as intersection modification, parking lots, and 
landscaping. While the engineering cost estimate should control for project-specific 
differences in cost, certain project classes have different pre-qualification standards. 
Hence, the pool o f potential bidders may differ somewhat across project types.
With respect to information on the level of competitiveness in an auction, three 
variables are used to measure competition. First, as is standard in the auction literature, 
the study controls for the number o f  bidders (log(#bidders)). Second, past information on 
rivals’ bidding success is used to summarize the competitiveness o f  the potential set of 
rivals (ARWP). The information in the plan-holder list helps identify the rivals for a 
particular auction. Recall that a bidder must be a plan-holder in order to participate in an 
auction and the plan-holder list is made available to all potential bidders prior to the 
auction. The measure o f  rivals’ past average success in auctions is constructed as the 
average across rivals o f the ratio o f  past wins to past number o f plans held. This variable 
incorporates two aspects o f past rival bidding behavior: the probability o f  a rival bidding 
given it is a plan-holder, and the probability o f a rival winning an auction given that it 
bids. Third, a dummy variable (IB) is included in the regression when an entrant is
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present in the auction and, thus, the rival information on past winning and bidding 
information is inconplete. The dummy is set equal to one when a bidder faces an entrant 
in an auction.
With respect to bidders’ own characteristics, two measures are included in the 
regressions. In order to distinguish entrants from incumbents, a dummy variable 
(l=entrant, 0=incumbent) is included. In addition to the entrant-incumbent variable, a 
variable is included that accounts for past success in auctions (WB): the ratio o f the past 
number o f wins to the past number o f  bids. This variable provides information on the 
previous bidding success o f a firm and is included to control for differences in 
efficiencies across producers.
The data samples vary across the dependent variables. To examine the bids, all 
bidders’ data for all auctions between July 1998 and August 2000 (where a contract was 
awarded) are included. When examining the winning bid and the money left on the table 
variable data from the winning bid record, as well as data at the auction level, are used. 
Contracts were awarded in 771 auctions. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the 
variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 3 presents the first set o f regression results. The models are estimated using 
ordinary using least squares and report White-corrected standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. The first column reports results for the log o f the bid variable. In this 
regression, the results indicate that entrants bid, on average, more aggressively than 
incumbents. This is not surprising given the bid distributions o f entrants and incumbents 
presented in Figure 1. Bidders that have a history o f higher than average past winnings 
tend to bid lower. The results on the prior-winning variable are mainly interpreted as
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picking out differences in efficiencies across bidders. As expected, the more competitive 
the set o f rivals a firm faces, the more aggressively the firm bids. This is in agreement 
with the theoretical results presented by Maskin and Riley (2000b) in Section III.2. 
Finally, the engineering estimate has the expected impact on the bid while the number of 
bidders does not appear to affect the log o f the bids.^^
The second column in Table 3 reports the results for the winning bid regression. 
The results show that entrants win with much more aggressive bids as compared to 
incumbents. Again, a firm that faces rivals with strong previous winning records wins 
with a more aggressive bid. However, in the winning bid regression, the prior winning 
rate has no effect on the level o f the winning bid. Hence, while firms with strong prior 
winning histories do bid lower, on average, relative to other firms (as is evident from the 
first column o f Table 3), they do not win with disproportionately below average bids. 
This point is reiterated in the money left on the table results. The last two columns of 
Table 3 indicate that entrants' aggressive bidding results in higher than average money 
being left on the table for entrant bidders under either definition o f  the money left on the 
table variable. Alternatively, one’s own past winning history and rivals' past winning 
histories do not have a statistically significant effect on the money left on the table.
The fact that entrants bid aggressively in the lower tail is more fully documented 
in Table 4. Table 4 presents information on bidding patterns o f incumbents and entrants 
at the lower end o f the distribution (lowest 25'*’ and lowest 10'*’ percentiles). The table 
indicates that entrants place a much larger proportion o f their bids in the bottom 25%
”  One issue is that the actual num ber o f  b idders is m ost likely endogenous. This point is raised in H endricks. Porter 
and Boudreau (1987) and has been recently exam ined by Porter and Zona (1999) and by Bajari (2000). L ater in this 
chapter, we report on the estim ates o f  a  m odel that uses the expected num ber o f  bidders calculated from  past 
information on the num ber o f  plan holders and the probability o f  participation.
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than do incumbents. The difference between the proportions o f  bids in the two groups is 
even more pronounced when you consider the lowest 10% o f bids.
These simple observations can be formalized in the analysis o f the quantile 
regression model (Koenker and Bassett, 1982) that follows. This model allows us to 
estimate differences in the distribution o f  bids between entrants and incumbents more 
accurately while taking into account other factors that contribute to the variability o f  bids. 
Estimation is restricted to five quantiles: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50. 0.75 and 0.90. The results o f 
these estimations are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
the logarithm o f bids. The analysis employs the same reduced form equation reported in 
Table 3 and emphasizes the difference in the bidding patterns o f the two groups. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable on entry varies substantially in the quantiles. 
Entrants’ bids are smaller than those o f  incumbents by a larger margin at the 0.10 
quantile (40.55%) than at the 0.25 quantile (24.00%) or the 0.50 quantile (10.05%), 
holding everything else constant. The difference becomes smaller and statistically 
insignificant beyond the 0.50 quantile. These results are in agreement with the 
theoretical findings in Section III.3. The differences in bidding patterns could be 
consistent with an asymmetric model o f auctions in which the distribution o f  an entrant's 
costs exhibits greater dispersion than that o f an incumbent’s.
When the logarithm o f the winning bid is considered as the dependent variable, 
then the differences in the two groups become more pronounced (see Table 6). In 
particular, holding everything else constant, entrants’ bids are smaller than those o f 
incumbents by a margin o f  72.31% at the 0.10 quantile, 35.15% at the 0.25 quantile, 
20.26% at the 0.50 quantile, and 11.032% at the 0.75 quantile. Clearly, the quantile
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regressions indicate that entrants’ bids are particularly aggressive at the lower tail o f the 
bid distributions.
To check on the robustness o f  the main results, several alternative specifications 
have been estimated. First, a more general specification for bidder experience has been 
considered. Here, in addition to the entry dummy variable, a set o f  dummy variables has 
been considered to distinguish the level o f bidder experience. Entrants’ results are robust 
to this change in specification, but there is little pattern in the coefficients for more 
experienced bidders. Hence, the aggressive bidding pattern observed for entrants is not 
found for bidders with only modest experience (see Table 7).
Second, the period o f analysis has been redefined: instead o f July 1998 to October 
2000, January 1999 to October 2000. This redefinition o f the sample redefines the 
entrant group. Here, an entrant is defined as a new bidder that appears in the January 
1999-August 2000 period. Under this new definition, two complete prior years (1997 & 
1998) o f bidding data are used to help identify incumbents and build up bidding histories. 
Given that both, the number o f  entrants and the number o f auctions, are reduced under 
this criterion, it is not surprising that this study loses some efficiency as compared to the 
original results reported in Table 3. Overall, the results hold up reasonably well (see 
Table 8). The coefficients on the entry variable are quite similar to those reported in 
Table 3. However, the effect o f entry in the winning bid and the money left on the table 
regressions is not statistically significant at the 5% level but is at the 10% level.
Third, the model using standard panel data techniques has been estimated. Rather 
than controlling for past winning history as the measure o f bidder heterogeneity, a 
random-effects model controls for the unobserved heterogeneity o f  bidders. A random-
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effects model is employed in this situation to use the cross-firm variation between 
incumbents and entrants to identify the entry parameter. A fixed-effects model would use 
only within-firm variation to estimate the entry parameter. In addition, a fixed-effects 
model effectively reduces the number o f entrant bids since a significant number of 
entering bidders submit only one bid during the period under study. The results are again 
consistent with the OLS results— entrants bid lower, win lower, and leave more money 
on the table as compared to incumbents (see Table 9).
Finally, the models using an expected number o f  bidders have been re-estimated 
(see Table 10). The expected number o f bidders was constructed using historical 
information on individual bidder participation rates. For entrants that have no such 
history, the estimate o f  average participation across all auctions was used. The results for 
the entrant’s own and rival characteristics are invariant to the use o f  expected versus 
actual number o f bidders. The effect of the expected number o f bidders, as compared to 
the actual number o f  bidders, is somewhat more muted across the regressions on the bids, 
the winning bid. and the money left on the table.^"*
III.6. Summary
This chapter examines the patterns o f  bidding by incumbent and entrant firms in 
road construction procurement auctions held by ODOT. It was found that entrants bid 
more aggressively, win with lower bids, and leave more money on the table than 
incumbent bidders. On a theoretical level, this study considered an asymmetric model of 
auctions, with emphasis on the characteristics o f these groups, and produced testable
W e also re-estim ate the m odels using the relative bid (bid to the engineering cost ratio) as the basis for the 
dependent variables (bids and winning bids). Entrants su b m it on average, lower relative bids and low er relative 
w inning bids. W e also check the sensitivity o f  the results to the removal o f  outlier bids. We re-estim ate the models 
using sam ples in which the very low bids and very high bids were omitted. The results show that entrants still subm it
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predictions: when the distribution o f an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than 
that o f an incumbent's, the entrant with a low cost estimate will bid more aggressively 
(relative to the engineering estimate) than the incumbent.
Bidders who have a history o f winning at auctions have a  tendency to bid lower 
but do not win with overly aggressive bids and do not leave money on the table. It was 
also found that rival bidder characteristics affect bidding behavior: the tougher the 
average rival is in an auction, the lower the bid and the lower the winning bid. These 
results are consistent with the theoretical predictions o f Maskin and Ridley (2000b) on 
bidding patterns in asymmetric auctions.
m ore aggressive bids, win w ith lower bids and leave more money on the table when extrem e observations are deleted 
from  the sample.
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III.7. Appendix
Let c/= O'Si + ti + ( l -a)Xj  sj /{n-l ) .  The density o f  the common cost component is 
g(s)  with support [5 /,, sh]- Similarly, a bidder's part o f the cost that is purely private is 
drawn from a distribution hi(t) with support [ti. 4/] where ti > 0. In order to ensure 
monotonicity and existence within this framework, it will be assumed that the densities 
h,{t) and g(j) are log-concave. It follows from Lemma 1, in Goeree and Offerman 
(1999). that the distribution o f vv/ = a  Si + F,,,. will also be log-concave and both
F(5|vv/^r) and F(5| w, = x) will be monotonie in .v.
Goeree and Offerman (1999) solved for the equilibrium inverse bid functions in a 
symmetric auction environment. The equilibrium in this first-price asymmetric sealed 
bid auction is characterized with two bidders. Notice that the bid is a monotonie function 
o f  vv,. Taking this into account, consider a bidder's expected payoff from participation:
K, (h) = [ b - a s , - t , - ( \  - a ) E[ s ^  | vv >  f i ; ' {b)]][l -  ( 5 ; '  (b))].
Differentiating the expected payoff with respect to b and evaluating the expression 
at the optimal choice:
; r , '(6 )  =  - [ 6  a)E[s ,  | vv > B' '  ( 6 ) ] ]A  ( # ; '  ( 6 ) )F ; ' (6) +
f  ( (^))
[1 - F . , ( S ; '( 6 ) ) i [ i+ ( I - o ) £ [ s , I w =
- ( \ - a ) E [ s ,  I W > s ; '( 6 ) l
=  [ - i + o j ,  + ( , + ( i - a , ) £ [ j j  vv =  s;'(i>)i]/. (S;'(*))fl,-'(*) + ! -F .(a ; ' (* ) )  = o,
where B / ‘{ b ) =  0'Si +  r, is defined over [or S i +  i t ,  a  s h  + ///]. 
It follows that for each j (j^ i^):
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1 - F ,  (g ; '(6 ) )  '  [ b - B - ' i b ) ]
where every Bf'(b)  is evaluated at b for all b in [b*, b ]. These differential equations 
should satisfy the following boundary conditions:
F , iB - \ b . ) )  = 0, 
b' = B - \a s „  + / „ )  V
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F ig u re > n i.l: E n tran ts ' and  Incum bents' Bid D istributions
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Figure-III.2: Experienced and Inexperienced Bidders’ Bid Distributions
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Tabie-III.l; Summary Statistics of Oklahoma Road Construction Auctions
V a r ia b le A u c tio n  S ta tis tic s  fo r  
Fu ll S am p le : 1997 :1 -2000 :8
A u c tio n  S ta tis tic s  fo r  
S econd  S am p le : 1998 :7 -2000 :8
N u m b er o f  A uctions 1736 952
N u m b er o f  A uctions w / 
W inners
1411 771
N u m b er o f  
F irm s
284 213
N u m b er o f  Plans 
Purchased
9542 5247
N u m b er o f  
B ids
5279 2785
A verage  N um ber o f 5.708 5.686
Plan ho lders per A uction (3 .014) (3 .059)
A verage  N um ber o f 3.323 3.183
B idders p e r A uction (1 .679) (1 .602)
N u m b er o f  Plans 
P urchased  by E ntrants
185
E ntran t B idders 71
E ntran t W inners 15
N ote: S tandard  D eviations are in parentheses.
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TabIe-III.2: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
V a ria b le M ean
(S tandard  D eviation)
L og  o f  Bids 13.0742
(1 .645)
L og o f  W inning B ids 12.8049
(1 .652)
M oney  L eft on the  Table -1 0.0988
(0 .107)
M oney  L eft on the T able -2 0.0624
(0 .087)
L og o f  E ng ineer’s Estim ate 13.0033
(1 .656)
S tandard  D eviation  o f  the Bids 0.1626
(0.225)
L og o f  N um ber o f  Bidders in an A uction 1.2783
(0 .473)
E n tran t D um m y V ariable 0.0248
(0.155)
D um m y V ariable fo r Incum bent B idders th a t face 0.1537
E ntrants (0 .361)
F irm ’s W inning to B idding Ratio 0.2608
(0.139)
A verage R ivals W inning to Plan holder R atio 0.1559
(0 .0635)
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Table-III.3: OLS Regression Results for Log of Bids, Log of Winning Bids, and 
Money Left on the Table
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
L og  o f  B ids L og o f  W in n in g  
Bids
M oney  L eft on  th e  T a b le  
(1) (2)
Constant 0.7618* 0.1901 0.4607* 0.2009*
(0 .0868) (0 .1265) (0 .0506) (0 .0444)
Project-1 -0 .0174 -0 .0367 -0 .0086 0 .0009
(0 .0236) (0 .0409) (0 .0178) (0 .0134)
Project-2 -0.1291 -0.3253 0 .0670 0.0803
(0 .0777) (0 .1753) (0 .0425) (0 .0437)
Project-3 -0 .0320 -0.0376 -0.0115 0 .0019
(0 .0229) (0 .0401) (0 .0165) (0 .0123)
Project-4 0.0228 -0.0157 0.0179 0 .0160
(0 .0271) (0 .0448) (0 .0188) (0 .0147)
Project-5 0.2053* 0.1940 -0 .0149 -0.0698*
(0 .0611) (0 .1028) (0 .0678) (0 .0223)
Project-6 -0 .1539* -0.0835* -0.0586* -0.0231
(0 .0296) (0 .0474) (0 .0182) (0 .0140)
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9588* 0.9952* -0.0279* -0.0124*
Estimate (0 .0061) (0 .0092) (0 .0034) (0 .0032)
L og o f  N um ber -0 .0116 -0.0593* -0.0206* -0.0120
o f  Bidders (0 .0110) (0 .0156) (0 .0074) (0 .0066)
Entry -0 .2152* -0.4042* 0.1039* 0.1099*
(0 .0692) (0 .1664) (0 .0457) (0 .0410)
Firm's Winning -0 .2816* -0.0343 0.0367 0.0342
to Bidding Ratio (0 .0458) (0 .0647) (0 .0283) (0 .0242)
Incumbent Bidders -0 .0180 -0.0386 0.0103 0 .0064
facin g  Entrants (0 .0175) (0 .0332) (0 .0113) (0 .0096)
Average Rivals Winning -0 .2110* -0.3764* 0.0759 0 .1096
to Plan holder Ratio (0 .1038) (0 .1277) (0 .0712) (0 .0595)
N u m b er o f  Obs. 2785 771 771 771
R- 0.9734 0.9789 0.2043 0 .1249
N ote: W hite heteroscedastic ity  corrected  standard  errors are in paren theses. * D enotes 95%  sign ificance.
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Table-III.4: Summary Statistics of Bid Frequency
Incumbents Entrants
T otal N u m b er o f  Bids 2716 69
N u m b er o f  B ids by the  group 
in the bottom  25%  o f  all bids
665 32
N u m b er o f  B ids by the  group 
in the  bottom  10% o f  all bids
254 24
Proportion  o f  b ids by the group 
in the bottom  25%  o f  all bids
24.48 46.38
Proportion  o f  b ids by  the group 
in the bottom  10% o f  all bids
9.35 34.78
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TabIe-III.5: Quantité Regression Results for Log of Bids
Variable Quantile
O.l 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Constant -0 .0934 0 .2047* 0.5605* 1.0814* 1.6015*
(0.1102) (0 .0221) (0 .0546) (0 .0730) (0 .1410)
Project-1 0.0101 0.0080 0.0015 -0 .0199 -0.0963*
(0.4056) (0 .0237) (0 .0206) (0 .0263) (0 .0435)
Project-2 -0 .5867* -0.2341* -0.0754* -0.0415 0.2118*
(0.0561) (0 .0336) (0.0295) (0 .0373) (0 .0616)
Project-3 -0 .0012 0.0266 0.0072 -0 .0204 -0.0824*
(0.0373) (0 .0219) (0 .0193) (0 .0245) (0 .0412)
Project-4 0.0049 0.0143 0.0176 0.0248 -0 .0110
(0 .0436) (0 .0250) (0.0220) (0 .0286) (0 .0469)
Project-5 0.1512 0.1275* 0.1882* 0.2846* 0.2144*
(0 .0799) (0 .0496) (0 .0437) (0 .0550) (0 .0850)
Project-6 -0.1181* -0.1213* -0.1305* -0.1437* -0.1997*
(0.0474) (0 .0274) (0 .0237) (0 .0302) (0 .0522)
Log o f  Engineer's 1.0029* 0.9875* 0.9710* 0.9441* 0.9169*
Estimate (0 .0077) (0 .0042) (0.0037) (0 .0050) (0 .0095)
Log o f  Number -0 .0100 -0.0053 -0.0143 -0 .0178 -0 .0069
o f  Bidders (0 .0152) (0 .0094) (0 .0087) (0 .0115) (0 .0201)
Entry -0 .4055* -0 .2400* -0.1005* 0 .0297 -0 .0186
(0 .0489) (0 .0303) (0.0265) (0 .0335) (0 .0568)
Firm's Winning -0 .1914* -0.1823* -0.1894* -0.2632* -0.3182*
to Bidding Ratio (0 .0599) (0 .0346) (0.0308) (0 .0421) (0 .0788)
Incumbent -0 .1480* -0 .0371* 0.0020 0.0271 0.0653*
Bidders facing  
Entrants
(0 .0213) (0 .0127) (0.0111) (0 .0141) (0 .0234)
Average Rivals -0.0943 -0 .1672* -0.2437* -0.3235* -0 .2540
Winning to Plan (0 .1396) 
holder Ratio
(0 .0757) (0.0690) (0 .0931) (0 .1754)
N um ber o f  O bs. 2785 2785 2785 2785 2785
R- 0.8420 0.8568 0.8666 0.8733 0.8553
N o te : S ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in p a re n th e se s . * D en o tes 9 5 %  s ig n ific a n ce .
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Table-lII.6: Quantile Regression Results for Log of Winning Bids
Variable Quantile
O.l 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Constant -0 .5210* 0 .0104 0.1752* 0.4176* 0.8108*
(0.2233) (0 .1260) (0 .0774) (0 .0880) (0 .1333)
Project-1 0.0017 0.0073 0.0140 0.0206 0 .0522
(0 .0850) (0 .0484) (0 .0300) (0 .0327) (0 .0437)
Project-2 -0 .5010* -0.5513* -0.3040* -0.0623 -0.1185*
(0 .1097) (0 .0719) (0 .0463) (0 .0487) (0 .0606)
Project-3 -0 .0206 0.0155 0.0222 0.0355 0.0602
(0 .0812) (0 .0458) (0 .0287) (0 .0314) (0 .0427)
Project-4 -0 .0454 -0 .0080 0.0087 0.0514* 0.1123*
(0.0922) (0 .0529) (0.0330) (0 .0359) (0 .0478)
Project-5 0.1329 0 .1576 0.2120* 0.0904 0.1245*
(0.0955) (0 .1024) (0.0674) (0 .0704) (0 .0511)
Project-6 -0 .0087 -0.0587 -0.0877* -0.0417 0.0597
(0 .0923) (0 .0548) (0 .0340) (0 .0377) (0 .0506)
Log o f  Engineer's 1.0345* 1.0017* 0.9935* 0.9784* 0.9561*
Estimate (0 .0151) (0 .0088) (0 .0052) (0 .0060) (0 .0093)
Log o f  Number -0.0686* -0.0408* -0.0454* -0.0493* -0.0690*
o f  Bidders (0 .0316) (0 .0185) (0 .0118) (0 .0131) (0 .0173)
Entry -0 .7231* -0.3515* -0.2026* -0.1103* -0.0316
(0 .0890) (0 .0661) (0 .0405) (0 .0428) (0 .0498)
Firm's Winning 0.0210 -0.1299 -0.1004* -0.0352 -0 .0610
to Bidding Ratio (0 .1119) (0 .0706) (0 .0445) (0 .0453) (0 .0467)
Incumbent -0 .1140* -0.0415 -0.0221 -0.0081 0 .0439
Bidders facing  
Entrants
(0 .0486) (0 .0280) (0 .0172) (0 .0428) (0 .0245)
Average Rivals -0 .5490* -0.4063* -0.2354* -0.2438* -0.4891*
Winning to Plan (0.2861 ) 
holder Ratio
(0 .1542) (0.0907) (0 .0930) (0 .1193)
N um ber o f  O bs. 771 771 771 771 771
R- 0.8488 0.8714 0.8889 0 .9036 0 .8979
N o te : S ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in p a re n th e se s . * D e n o te s  9 5 %  s ig n ific a n ce .
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Table-III.7: OLS Regression Results for Log of Bids, Log of Winning Bids, and
Money Left on the Table: Alternative Experience Specification
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
L og o f  B ids L og o f  W in n in g  
B ids
M oney  L eft on  th e  T a b le  
(1) (2)
Constant 0.7990* 0.2304 0.4627* 0 .1988*
(0.0873) (0 .1299) (0 .0509) (0 .0454 )
Project-1 -0 .0200 -0 .0399 -0 .0039 0 .0032
(0 .0234) (0 .0411) (0 .0180) (0 .0135 )
Project-2 -0 .1334 -0.3238 0.0767 0 .0834
(0 .0775) (0 .1777) (0 .0430) (0 .0449 )
Projcct-3 -0 .0386 -0.0443 -0.0081 0 .0043
(0 .0230) (0 .0403) (0 .0170) (0 .0 1 2 7 )
Project-4 0.0219 -0.0245 0.0247 0 .0205
(0 .0269) (0 .0455) (0 .0192) (0 .0 1 5 0 )
Project-5 0.2068* 0.2022 0.0051 -0 .0606*
(0.0608) (0 .1052) (0 .0666) (0 .0 2 4 5 )
Project-6 -0.1569* -0.0965* -0.0526* -0 .0187
(0 .0295) (0 .0471) (0 .0186) (0 .0 1 4 3 )
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9579* 0.9947* -0.0287* -0 .0129*
Estimate (0 .0061) (0 .0095) (0 .0034) (0 .0033 )
Log o f  Number -0 .0114 -0.0566* -0.0215* -0 .0130*
o f  Bidders (0.01 I I ) (0 .0158) (0 .0073) (0 .0065 )
Entry -0.2383* -0.4384* 0.1066* 0.1162*
(0 .0688) (0 .1645) (0 .0449) (0 .0404 )
Experience Dummy-1 -0.0401 -0.0875 -0.0372* -0 .0108
(0 .0324) (0 .0475) (0 .0171) (0 .0131 )
Experience Dummy-2 -0 .0276 -0.0335 0.0131 0 .0156
(0 .0197) (0 .0631) (0 .0118) (0 .0 1 1 2 )
Experience Dummy-3 -0 .0239 -0 .0552* 0.0186* 0.0163*
(0.0126) (0 .0194) (0 .0091) (0 .0 0 7 1 )
Experience Dummy-4 -0 .0389* -0.0429* 0.0133 0 .0115
(0 .0112) (0 .0179) (0 .0086) (0 .0 0 7 3 )
Firm's Winning -0.2808* -0.0220 0.0248 0 .0276
to Bidding Ratio (0 .0450) (0 .0656) (0 .0269) (0 .0 2 3 9 )
Incumbent Bidders -0.0163 -0.0331 0.0114 0 .0064
Facing Entrants (0 .0174) (0 .0332) (0 .0113) (0 .0 0 9 5 )
Average Rivals Winning -0 .2058* -0.3831* 0 .0764 0 .1093
to  Plan holder Ratio (0 .1040) (0 .1257) (0 .0701) (0 .0 5 9 6 )
N u m b er o f  O bs. 2785 771 771 771
R- 0.9735 0.9791 0.2157 0 .1322
N ote: W hite he teroscedastic ity  co rrec ted  standard  errors are in parentheses. * D enotes 95%  s ign ificance .
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Table-III.8: OLS Regression Results for Log of Bids, Log of Winning Bids, and
Money Left on the Table: Alternative Entry Specification
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
L og o f  B ids L og o f  W in n in g  
Bids
M oney  L e ft on  th e  T a b le  
(1) (2)
Constant 0.6882* 0 .1286 0.4480* 0 .1874*
(0 .0909) (0 .1355) (0 .0548) (0 .0486)
Project-1 -0 .0154 -0 .0328 -0.0078 0 .0055
(0 .0253) (0 .0458) (0 .0192) (0 .0147)
Project-2 -0 .0654 -0.3743* 0.0612 0.0941
(0 .0764) (0 .1744) (0 .0493) (0 .0514)
Project-3 -0 .0239 -0 .0466 -0.0011 0 .0124
(0 .0249) (0 .0457) (0 .0178) (0 .0134)
Project-4 0.0125 -0.0351 0.0195 0 .0237
(0 .0285) (0 .0491) (0 .0205) (0 .0163 )
Project-5 0.2010* 0.2573* 0.0064 -0 .0690*
(0 .0722) (0 .1151) (0 .0800) (0 .0278)
Project-6 -0.1356* -0.0685* -0.0444* -0 .0154
(0 .0329) (0 .0544) (0 .0200) (0 .0155)
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9629* 1.0011* -0.0278* -0 .0127*
Estimate (0 .0064) (0 .0096) (0 .0037) (0 .0036)
Log o f  Number -0 .0074 -0.0558* -0.0188* -0 .0100
o f  Bidders (0 .0113) (0 .0173) (0 .0084) (0 .0074)
Entry -0 .1938* -0.4037 0.0915* 0 .1027
(0 .0796) (0 .2117) (0 .0567) (0 .0537)
F irm ’s  Winning -0 .2791* -0.0815 0.0503 0 .0446
to Bidding Ratio (0 .0476) (0 .0677) (0 .0337) (0 .0289)
Incumbent Bidders -0 .0029 -0 .0389 0.0154 0.0103
who fa ce  Entrants (0 .0188) (0 .0363) (0 .0132) (0 .0115)
Average Rivals Winning -0 .1431* -0.4000* 0.0944 0.1467*
to Plan holder Ratio (0 .1075) (0 .1360) (0 .0793) (0 .0651)
N um ber o f  Obs. 2265 632 632 632
R- 0.9751 0.9800 0.1984 0 .1242
N o te : W h ite  h e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  c o rre c te d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in p a re n th e se s . * D e n o te s  9 5 %  s ig n if ic a n c e .
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Table-III.9: Random Effects Regression Results for Log of Bids, Log of Winning
Bids, and Money Left on the Table
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Log o f  B ids L og o f  W in n in g  
Bids
M oney  L eft on th e  T a b le  
(1) (2)
Constant 0.8632* 0.2934* 0.4153* 0.1631*
(0.0750) (0 .1156) (0 .0478) (0 .0410)
Project-1 -0 .0075 0.0344 -0.0337 -0 .0025
(0 .0264) (0 .0447) (0 .0186) (0 .0159)
Project-2 -0 .0925* -0.2906* 0.0669* 0.0662*
(0 .0414) (0 .0861) (0 .0340) (0 .0297)
Project-3 0.0037 -0.0267 -0.0231 -0 .0009
(0 .0263) (0 .0441) (0 .0183) (0 .0157)
Project-4 0.0577* 0.0438 0.0113 0 .0097
(0 .0277) (0 .0481) (0 .0201) (0 .0172)
Project-5 0.2019* 0.1037 -0.0334 -0 .0523
(0 .0564) (0 .1072) (0.0440) (0 .0378)
Project-6 -0 .0328 -0.0241 -0.0488 -0 .0295
(0 .0413) (0 .0628) (0 .0256) (0 .0221 )
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9412* 0.9816* -0.0226* -0.0078*
Estimate (0 .0050) (0 .0079) (0 .0033) (0 .0028)
Log o f  Number -0 .0136 -0.0585* -0.0188* -0.0122*
o f  Bidders (0 .0108) (0 .0164) (0 .0069) (0 .0059)
Entry -0 .5586* -0.3571* 0.1011* 0.1017*
(0 .0415) (0 .0819) (0.0310) (0 .0275)
Incumbent Bidders 0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0 .0043
who fa ce  Entrants (0 .0139) (0 .0239) (0 .0100) (0 .0086)
Average Rivals Winning -0.1934* -0.3834* 0.0510 0 .1033*
to Plan holder Ratio (0 .0916) (0 .1361) (0 .0569) (0 .0486)
N um ber o f  Obs. 2785 771 771 771
R- 0.9726 0.9785 0.1936 0 .1137
N ote: S tandard  errors are  in parentheses. * D enotes 95%  significance.
4 9
Table-III.lO: OLS Regression Results for Log of Bids, Log of Winning Bids, and
Money Left on the Table: With Expected Number of Bidders
Independent
Variable
Dependent Variable
L og o f  B ids L og  o f  W in n in g  
B ids
M oney  L eft on  th e  T a b le  
(1) (2)
Constant 0.7532* 0.1460 0.4465* 0 .1988*
(0.0858) (0 .1280) (0 .0494) (0 .0454)
Project-1 -0 .0130 -0 .0368 -0.0068 0.0031
(0 .0239) (0 .0430) (0 .0182) (0 .0138)
Project-2 -0.1388 -0 .3357 0.0062 0 .0762
(0 .0772) (0 .1740) (0 .0432) (0 .0438)
Project-3 -0 .0332 -0 .0389 -0 .0119 0 .0016
(0 .0230) (0 .0410) (0 .0168) (0 .0121)
Project-4 0.0206 -0.0141 0.0181 0 .0159
(0 .0271) (0 .0455) (0 .0191) (0 .0146)
Project-5 0.2047* 0.1893 -0.0163 -0 .0704*
(0.0615) (0 .1058) (0 .0685) (0 .0215)
Project-6 -0 .1545* -0 .0874 -0.0601* -0 .0240
(0 .0297) (0 .0485) (0 .0186) (0 .0139)
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9568* 0.9953* -0.0284* -0 .0130*
Estimate (0 .0062) (0 .0100) (0 .0034) (0 .0033)
Log o f  Number 0,0160 -0.0275 -0.0045 0 .0007
o f  Expected Bidders (0 .0112) (0 .0191) (0 .0081) (0 .0067)
Entry- -0.2182* -0.4151* 0.0992* 0.1066*
(0.0693) (0 .1660) (0 .0463) (0 .0413)
Firm 's Winning -0.2717* -0 .0137 0.0447 0 .0395
to Bidding Ratio (0 .0451) (0 .0657) (0 .0285) (0 .0240)
Incumbent Bidders -0 .0237 -0 .0422 0.0079 0 .0042
Facing Entrants (0 .0176) (0 .0337) (0 .0115) (0 .0098)
Average Rivals Winning -0.2110* -0.3514* 0.0793 0 .1080
to Plan holder Ratio (0 .1056) (0 .1274) (0 .0725) (0 .0609)
N um ber o f  Obs. 2785 771 771 771
R- 0.9734 0 .9786 0.1960 0 .1205
N o te : W h ite  h e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  c o rre c te d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in p a ren th ese s . *  D e n o tes  9 5 %  s ig n if ic a n c e .
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CHAPTER IV
SEQUENTIAL BIDDING IN AUCTIONS OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
IV. 1. Introduction
This essay investigates differences in bidding patterns between morning and 
afternoon auctions o f construction contracts held by the ODOT in the period July 1998 to 
August 2000. The empirical literature on sequential auctions has mainly examined the 
direction o f  expected prices. This essay emphasizes differences in bidding behavior in 
later sessions conditional on the outcome (success or failure) o f earlier auctions. This 
essay incorporates the number o f bidders in these auctions, the characteristics o f 
contracts, a measure o f efficiency for each firm 's rivals, and capital commitment that 
imposes budgetary restrictions. Evidence o f strategic behavior has been found that is 
consistent with the predictions on asymmetric models o f auctions. The asymmetries 
intensify in afternoon auctions due to the release o f information in morning sessions.
The overwhelming majority o f  the theoretical work on sequential auctions 
assumes that bidders demand a single object. In auctions o f construction contracts, 
however, there is no statistically significant difference in the probability o f  winners and 
losers o f  morning auctions submitting a bid. In this framework, the assumption o f  single 
unit demand would take away much o f the asymmetry that characterizes bidding behavior 
in later roimds. Since the opportunity cost o f completing a contract is different for each 
potential contractor and the differences become common knowledge through early 
bidding, asymmetries play an important role in this setting. In afternoon auctions, there 
is a significant adjustment in bidding behavior that is induced by the release o f
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information on prices and bids in morning auctions. The evidence o f bidding behavior in 
the afternoon auctions is consistent with some o f  the theoretical predictions in Maskin 
and Riley (2000b). For example. Proposition 3.3 predicts that, if a weak bidder faces a 
strong rather than another weak bidder, he responds with a more aggressive bid 
distribution. Further, this essay suggests that, on average, the more competitive the set of 
rivals a firm faces, the more aggressive are its bids. Even though the difference in the 
probability o f submitting a bid is not statistically significant between winners and losers 
o f  early auctions, losers make a much larger adjustment in their afternoon bids relative to 
the winners. As shown in Maskin and Riley (2000b), identifying the nature o f  these 
asymmetries is important for the selection o f  the appropriate revenue-maximizing 
mechanism.
IV.2. Data
Bidding patterns for road construction projects are examined utilizing data from 
ODOT. The data contains information on all projects offered for bid letting by the State 
o f Oklahoma between January 1997 and August 2000. These projects include road 
construction and paving, traffic signals, bridge construction and maintenance, as well as 
smaller drainage and clearance type projects. The state auctions o ff projects on a 
monthly basis and uses a sealed-bid auction format wherein the lowest bidder is awarded 
the contract.
To examine the process o f sequential bidding, both morning and afternoon 
sessions are utilized. Bids must be received half an hour before each session. Hence, the 
outcomes from the morning session are known before the bids must be received for the 
afternoon session. In fact, there is a small window o f time— 3.5 hours— between the
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opening o f the morning bids and the closing o f the afternoon bids. This allows potential 
bidders to alter their bids or, possibly, their decision to participate in the afternoon 
session. Discussions with state officials have revealed that bids do arrive right up to the 
last possible moment.
Tire auction data that this study utilizes includes information on the identity o f the 
firms that purchase plans for a project— “the plan holders,” the identity and bids o f all 
bidders for a project, and the winning bid (if the contract is awarded). Since, the data 
allow us to identify both firms holding plans and firms bidding, individual firm s' bidding 
behavior across the morning and afternoon sessions are followed. In addition to 
information on the identity o f potential bidders, the state also provides detailed 
information on the specific project; a description o f the project (e.g., bridge construction, 
asphalt paving, etc.), the details o f the project, the duration o f the project (calendar days), 
the engineering estimate o f the project’s total cost, and the date and time o f  letting.
Throughout this analysis, the auction sample is divided into two time periods— 
January 1997 to June 1998, and July 1998 to August 2000. The first period is used to 
create historically based variables such as measures o f  rival efficiency and capacity 
commitment. The details o f variable construction are discussed below. Only the bidding 
data o f  firms that submit multiple bids on a given auction day are utilized in order to use 
panel data techniques to control for unobserved bidder heterogeneity. In addition, to 
learn the effect o f  morning outcomes on afternoon bidding, firms submitting more than 
one bid are utilized. Table 1 provides data on both the overall sample and the sample 
restricted to multiple bidders. In the overall sample for July 1998 to August 2000. there 
were 952 auctions with 5247 plans purchased and 2785 bids submitted. This represents
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the activity o f  213 individual firms. In our multiple-bid sample, 93 firms were
represented and they submitted 1743 bids, purchasing 2473 plans.
IV.3. Empirical Analysis
The probability o f participation in these auctions was analyzed first. Recall that 
both, the plan-holders and the bidders are known and, hence, the firms that actually 
submit a bid can be identified. The independent variables include controls for project 
characteristics, bidder characteristics, and rival characteristics in each auction. The 
project characteristics include the state’s estimate o f the engineering cost (log(engest)), 
and a set o f dummy variables for project types (Pi's). The state constructs the engineering 
cost estimates by pricing each feature outlined in the design.^^
With respect to bidders’ own characteristics, a variable that describes capacity 
commitment (backlog) is included: for every contract won, the average monthly value is 
calculated. Each subsequent month, the average monthly value is subtracted from the 
initial size o f  the contract until the completion time o f the project. Based on this 
calculation, the total remaining value o f the projects that a firm has undertaken is 
determined at any given point in time. A firm that wins a contract at any point in time 
limits its free capacity to complete contracts in the future. Additional commitment o f 
capital implies more budgetary restrictions since firms must include a payment o f  5% of 
the value o f the project upon submission o f  the bid. This is similar to the capacity 
measure used in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000). In addition to the capacity 
measure, dummy variables are included that indicate whether the firm won or lost in the
”  T he p ro jec t dum m ies contro l for broad  c lasses o f  p ro ject types — asp h a lt p ro jects, c lea rance  and 
bank  p ro tec tion ; b ridge w ork, grading and drain ing , concrete  w ork, signals and  lighting  p ro jects. The 
om itted  g ro u p  is m iscellaneous w ork  such  as in tersection  m odification , park ing  lots, and  landscap ing .
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morning. These are the variables that will pick up differences in the probability to submit
bids in the afternoon based on morning results.
Past information on rivals’ bidding success is used to summarize the 
competitiveness o f the potential set o f rivals (ARWP). The information provided in the 
plan-holder list allows us to identify the rivals for a particular auction. Note that a bidder 
must be a plan-holder in order to participate in an auction and the plan-holder list is made 
available to all potential bidders prior to the auction. The measure o f  rivals' past average 
success in auctions is constructed as the average across rivals o f the ratio o f  past wins to 
the past number o f plans held. This variable incorporates two aspects o f past rival 
bidding behavior; the probability o f a rival bidding given that it is a plan-holder, and the 
probability the rival wins an auction given that it bids.
The results o f the probit analysis presented in column 1 o f Table 2 reveals that 
there is no statistically significant difference between winners and losers in morning 
auctions in their probability to bid in the afternoon. This is contrary to an assumption, 
typically made in models o f sequential auctions, that bidders have unitary demand. This 
assumption precludes the introduction o f asymmetries that could complicate the analysis 
o f  bidding behavior. The analysis o f bidding behavior in the afternoon auctions, 
conditional on the outcome o f the morning auctions, will emphasize these asymmetries. 
These asymmetries lead to bidding patterns consistent with Maskin and Riley’s (2000b) 
theoretical predictions.
Sequential bidding patterns in morning and afternoon sessions are examined with 
a simple reduced-form model o f  bidding in a procurement auction. The basic structure o f 
the regression model is as follows
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log(6,K, ) = P„ + Pi yogiengesl,^, ) + /?, [og{U bidders,^, ) + winAM,,
7=1
+ P J o s e A M ,  + p ,^ \og{backlog,^, ) + /?,, AR WP, ,^ + e,^,.
Our dependent variable in the regression is the log o f the bid. The independent 
variables include a set o f dummy variables for project characteristics (P/s), the log of 
engineering estimates, the number o f  bidders (log(#bidders)), controls for characteristics 
o f  the bidders (winAM, loseAM, and log(backlog)), and the characteristics o f  the rivals in 
each auction (ARWP).
Alternatively, this study will utilize a fixed-effects estimator that allows for 
bidder-time period effects. In this case, the error term is specified in the above equation
as 6 igt = u„ + 17,gt. The mean effect, captured here by u ,,, is a bidder-time-specific effect. 
Hence, different bidder effects are allowed for each auction date. This is important if 
bidder efficiency levels that are not captured by the backlog variable vary across time. 
When the fi.xed-effects model was estimated, the backlog variable was dropped. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis is that the dummy variables that indicate whether the firm 
won or lost in the morning will pick up differences in the aggressiveness o f bids in the 
afternoon based on morning results.
Column 2 o f  Table 2 presents the OLS regression results and incorporates White- 
corrected standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. The results show that the more 
capacity a firm commits, the less aggressively it bids in an auction. The effect o f a 
backlog on bids is small but consistent with Pitchik and Schotter's (1988) theory that 
attributes less aggressive bidding to budgetary restrictions. It is also consistent with the 
findings o f  Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000). Looking at the afternoon bidding 
dummies, one can see that firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively in the
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afternoon. However, it is probably the case that our measure o f  backlog is not fully 
controlling for differences in firm efficiencies and that the negative coefficient on this 
variable reflects differences in overall efficiencies (winners vs. losers) as opposed to 
differences in the bidding behavior in the morning and in the afternoon. To correct for 
this potential, the model is estimated with firm-time period effects that should control for 
differences in unobserved heterogeneity across firms on a given auction day. In contrast 
to the OLS results that exploit cross-firm variation in bids, the fixed-effects results allow 
for a comparison of a given bidder’s bidding behavior in the morning and afternoon. The 
results presented in Column 3 o f Table 2 suggest that, on average, those firms that lost in 
morning sessions bid more aggressively in the afternoon, relative to their morning bid. 
than those firms that won at least one project. The winners o f early auctions are typically 
the stronger bidders and, conditional on the outcome o f early auctions, the weak bidders 
(i.e., the morning losers) adjust their strategies and bid more aggressively in afternoon 
auctions. In addition, the fixed effects results suggest that the more competitive the set o f 
rivals a firm faces, the more aggressively the firm bids. These results are consistent with 
the prediction in Maskin and Riley's (2000b) Proposition 3.5: if  a weak bidder faces a 
strong bidder rather than another weak bidder, it will bid more aggressively and vice 
versa.^*
M askin  and  R iley (2000b) prove  that in the h igh bid auction , the d is tribu tion  o f  bids o f  th e  strong  buyer 
stochastica lly  dom inates th a t o f  the w eak buyer. In auctions o f  construction  con tracts, in w h ich  the  low est 
b id d e r is aw arded  the p ro ject, the inverse w ould  hold. N otice th a t stochastic  dom inance  in the d istribu tion  
o f  b id s  im plies th a t the m ean value from  one d istribu tion  w ill exceed  the m ean value from  the  o ther. In th a t 
sense , ou r resu lts  p rov ide  ev idence  supporting  th e ir theory.
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Table- IV. 1: Summary Statistics of Oklahoma Road Construction Auctions
V a ria b le A uction  S ta tis tic s  fo r 
S am p le : 1998:7-2000:8
A u c tio n  S ta t is tic s  fo r  
M u ltip le  B ids S a m p le
N um ber o f  A uctions 952 744
N um ber o f  Firm s 213 93
N um ber o f  Plans Purchased 5247 2473
N um ber o f  AM  Plans Purchased 2851 1269
N um ber o f  PM Plans Purchased 2396 1204
N um ber o f  Bids (A M  and PM ) 2785 1743
N um ber o f  AM  Bids 1511 898
N um ber o f  PM Bids 1274 845
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TabIe-IV.2: Regression Results
Independent Dependent Variable: L og  o f  B ids
Variable Probit OLS Fixed Effects
Constant 1.9608* 0.5615* 0.9326*
(0 .3763) (0 .1146) (0 .0989)
Project-1 0.2262 -0.0128 0.0450
(0 .1492) (0 .0365) (0 .0404)
Project-2 0.0991 -0.0117 -0 .1224*
(0 .2233) (0 .0959) (0 .0588)
Project-3 -0 .0327 0.0172 O. I l l O*
(0 .1394) (0 .0361) (0 .0388)
Project-4 -0 .0868 -0.0418 0.1314*
(0 .1516) (0 .0417) (0 .0423)
Project-5 -0.1491 0.2415* 0.2491*
(0 .3125) (0 .0824) (0 .0827)
Project-6 0.7783* -0.0850* 0.0102
(0 .2031) (0 .0433) (0 .0622)
Log o f  Engineer's -0 .1513* 0.9629* 0.9327*
Estimate (0 .0254) (0 .0084) (0 .0068)
Log o f  Number -0 .0076 -0.0035
o f  Bidders (0 .0138) (0 .0143)
h irms that won 0.3273* -0.0905* -0.0115
in the morning (0 .0717) (0 .0169) (0 .0157)
Firms that lost 0.3364* -0.0104 -0 .0800*
in the morning (0 .0650) (0 .0104) (0 .0145)
Log o f  Firm's 0.0206* 0.0032*
Backlog (0 .0043) (0 .0014)
Average Rivals Winning -1 .5531* -0.1263 -0 .2856*
to Plan holder Ratio (0 .5301) (0 .1227) (0 .1296)
N um ber o f  O bs. 2274 1743 1743
R- 0.9713 0 .9694
W ald r 203.23
N o te : W h ite  h e te ro sc e d a s tic ity  c o rre c te d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  a re  in  p a ren tlte se s . * D e n o te s  9 5 %  s ig n if ic a n c e .
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CHAPTER V 
SYNERGIES IN RECURRING PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATION
V .l. Introduction
This essay empirically investigates the impact o f synergies and competitive 
advantages on bidder behavior in recurring auctions o f road construction contracts held 
by ODOT from January 1997 to August 2000. In this study, synergies are defined as 
complementarities associated with winning a project(s) in a particular geographic area 
that are experienced by a previous winner with an ongoing project(s) in that area. 
Further, a firm’s valuation o f a project may depend upon competitive advantages 
associated with bidders’ familiarity with local market resources, and inherent firm 
efficiencies. The first two advantages are crucially correlated to geographical space. 
Porter and Zona (1999), in their study o f dairies bidding for contracts to supply milk, and 
Bajari (2001), in his study o f highway construction firms bidding for procurement 
contracts, have also shown that location plays a major role in a firm’s bidding behavior 
when collusion between firms is present.
When projects are irregularly dispersed and recorded as points in the landscape, it 
is more difficult to define a set o f  “ influential” neighboring projects. Therefore, spatial 
relationships that reflect a decaying distance between points or locations identified by 
latitudes and longitudes are often assumed to be appropriate. Thus, when there is a 
correlation among projects due to location (spatial correlation), ignoring spatial 
interdependence o f projects is like ignoring the sequential ordering o f time-series studies.
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Each year, federal and state agencies initiate large numbers o f  auctions that are 
spatially correlated/^ An understanding o f these spatial correlations could help state and 
federal governments sequence auctions o f related projects more efficiently. This 
understanding is also beneficial to bidding firms, enabling them to take advantage o f the 
synergies and economic advantages described above.
Recently, Krishna and Rosenthal (1995) and Branco (1997) have shown that, in 
recurring auctions, bundle bidders who bid on multiple objects bid more aggressively 
than unit bidders who bid on a single object. Jeitschko and W olfstetter (2001) have 
described bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid ascending recurring auctions and 
show that bidders who have previously won may experience the synergies described 
above in subsequent auctions.
Empirical research on synergies in auctions is scarce. Gandal ( 1997) shows that 
complementarities associated with winning multiple projects in a particular geographic 
area enhanced the values o f neighboring CATV licenses in major metropolitan areas in 
Israel. Ausubel et al (1997)^* show that there are geographic synergies associated with 
winning multiple adjacent licenses in spectrum license auctions in the United States. 
Rusco and Walls (1999) show that, in repeated spatially correlated timber auctions, 
bidders with complementarities associated with winning multiple projects bid more 
aggressively. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000) use data from repeated highway 
construction procurement auctions to show that the distance between firms and projects 
have a negative impact on the submission and value o f bids. In addition, they have
”  F or exam ple, cab le  te lev is ion  and te lecom m unications licenses, tim ber auctions, road-construction  
auctions. See R usco and  W alls (A ugust 1999).
T h is study  investigates the  existence o f  synerg ies in broadband  personal com m unication  service 
spectrum  (PC S) ascend ing-b id  auctions in U nited  States.
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shown that capacity unconstrained bidders (bidders with low backlogs) are more likely to
submit a bid and to bid more aggressively than bidders with high capacity constraints.
In this study, 1 examine bidders’ behavior in recurring auctions o f  road 
construction contracts held by ODOT between January 1997 and August 2000 to 
determine whether they have been affected by the synergies and competitive advantages 
(or no advantages) described above. This essay documents the participation patterns and 
differences in bidding patterns among firms to argue that they are caused by synergies 
that are spatially correlated and reports that, when a firm with potential synergies and 
competitive advantages participates in a recurring procurement auction, its probability of 
winning the auction, conditional upon bidding, increases. Further, this study finds that 
firms with potential synergies and competitive advantages bid more aggressively. 
Finally, the study supports Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer’s (2000) claim that, when a 
firm’s capacity constraint is low, it tends to bid more aggressively.
Section V.2 describes the modeling framework used in this study. Section V.3 
outlines the equilibrium strategies utilized in this model. Section V.4 describes the data 
set; Section V.5 reports the results o f the empirical analysis; and Section V .6  summarizes 
the main points o f the essay.
V.2. Model
Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2001) first developed the comparative model used in 
this study. They analyzed economic advantages in terms of economies o f  scale in first- 
price sealed-bid ascending auctions. This essay adapts their model to investigate first- 
price sealed-bid auctions o f construction contracts and emphasizes synergies in which the 
lowest bidder is awarded the project.
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Consider a sequence o f two auctions in each o f  which a single project is auctioned 
to two bidders^^. The winner o f the first auction is hereafter referred to as the incumbent 
and the loser is the contestant. Prior to the first auction, each bidder privately observes 
his cost for the first project (C) but not the cost for the second project (C//). A winner 
(the bidder with the lowest bid) is announced at the conclusion o f the first auction, and 
then the bidders privately observe C//, a random variable that depends upon the history 
(H) o f  a firm’s winning or losing the first auction. The incumbent bidder has the 
potential to gain from synergies by winning the second project. In the second auction, 
the valuation o f  the incumbent bidder is Q  and that o f  the contestant bidder is Cc- C  is 
drawn from a known distribution normalized to {0 , c}, c >0 , with probability /?, where 
0<p := Pr {C = c}<l. The valuation o f the second project is also drawn from {0. c}, c 
>0. but Cii and Cc are stochastically independent. The probability o f the event C,/ = c, 
{H  6  {/. C}) is not the same for incumbent and contestant bidders. W hereas the 
incumbent bidder with potential synergies gains from winning multiple projects in the 
same geographic location, the contestant bidder may not. Incumbent bidders have a 
higher probability o f drawing a lower valuation for the project (a) as compared to the 
contestant (i.e., 0 < p  < cr< 1) due to synergies and competitive advantages but, if  they 
do not observe competitive advantages, their probability o f incurring a lower valuation is 
0 < a  < p <  Hence, synergies and competitive advantages increase the expected value 
o f a  project for an incumbent.
Risk-neutral bidders maximize the sum o f the payoffs from both auctions by placing 
real-valued bids. Thus, the study assumes that bidders do not discount their expected
' T he s tudy  differen tia tes betw een groups o f  tw o b idders w ith  em phasis on incumbent b idders and
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payoffs for the second auction. This assumption is valid to this study’s data set where 
bidders do not know about upcoming projects until the winners are notified about the 
results o f the current auction. The payoff in the second auction is
Uh (Cfi) := Pr {winning the 2"*^  auction} {P: -  C//), H  e  {/,C}, (V. 1)
where Pj denotes the price received after the completion o f the project, which is equal to 
the winning bid. As noted earlier, in a first-price sealed-bid auction, the incumbent will 
bid with probability crand the contestant will bid with probability p  when the incumbent 
has synergies and competitive advantages. The overall payoff, evaluated at the time o f 
the first auction is
U{C) := Pr (winning the auction} ( / ’/ -  C + £[f//(C /)])
+ ( 1- Pr { winning the 1 ‘^ auction }) E[Uc{Cc)\,  (V.2 )
where Pi denotes the price received after the completion o f the project, which is equal to 
the winning bid.
Let A denote the ex ante value o f the synergy component. This is equal to the 
expected payoff differences between an incumbent and a contestant.
A:=E[U , iC , )] -E[UciCc)] ,  (V.3)
contestant b idders.
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The overall payoff U (C) can be identified as
U(C) := Pr { winning the auction } (P/ -  C + A) + E[Uc (Cc)], (V.4)
which is equal to the expected payoff o f the contestant from the first auction and the 
realized synergy and profits gained by the probability o f winning the first auction. In the 
first auction, ties are broken by the flip o f a fair coin. In the second auction, the 
incumbent will bid aggressively if  incurring synergies or competitive advantages. 
However, if  the incumbent firm does not observe competitive advantages, it will bid less 
aggressively than contestants will. When the support o f the distribution o f  types is 
discrete, rather than continuous, the players must play a mixed strategy in equilibrium.
This study applies the above model as follows: In a repeated procurement auction, 
the winner o f  a project will be viewed as an incumbent. When incumbents bid in related 
projects, they may observe potential synergies and, therefore, may bid more aggressively 
than contestants. However, incumbency is not permanent. A firm may lose its 
incumbency if  it does not have any ongoing projects and will then bid as a contestant. 
This study investigates the effects o f synergies on the bidding behavior o f  incumbents 
and contestants.
V.3. Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we consider equilibrium strategies for bidders that may have 
potential synergies in the projects they are bidding for. Suppose both bidders draw cost C 
= c - A  with probability p, and cost C = c with probability l-p, randomizing according to 
the distribution strategy F(s): [si, sh] [0, 1]: and then = c and sl = c - Ap. Now,
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consider first-price sealed-bid auctions with synergies. The incumbent has a higher 
probability o f incurring a low valuation for the second project than the contestant. 
Hence, the unique equilibrium strategies o f this auction are‘*°:
Proposition 1 (Second Auction): In equilibrium, when <j> p  (with synergies), bidders 
with C //=  c bid their value and bidders with Cn= c - A  play mixed strategies Fh ; [c-Ap, 
c] [0, 1]. Thus, the bid distributions can be expressed as follows:
b, (c) = c. H e  {/, C} (bidder with C = c) (V.5)
F(. (6 ) = 1 -  —— — —  (contestant bidder with C = c - A) (V.6 )
' p i b - c  + A)
F, (b) = \ -  —— — - — — —  (incumbent bidder with C - c -  A). (V.7)
a ( b - c  + A)
Bidder’s equilibrium payoffs are:
Un(0) = 0, Un{c) = c { p -  1), H  e  {/, C). (V.8 )
The synergy component is calculated as follows. In the second auction, the 
bidder has a positive expected payoff only if he has cost Cn= c - A. Therefore, after the 
first auction and before the second auction, the incumbent bidder’s payoff is £  [(// (C/)] = 
<j{\-p)A, whereas the contestant bidder’s payoff is £  [Uc (Cc)] = p  {\-p)A. Hence, by 
definition (V.3),
As := { a  - p) {\ - p)A. (V.9)
See also Jeitschko and  W olfste tter (2001 ).
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Note that a bidder takes into account the fact that, as a result o f his winning the 
first auction, the contestant will recognize him as an incumbent bidder.
Now, consider the first auction. Proposition 2 summarizes the first auction as 
follows:
Proposition 2 (First auction): In equilibrium, when a >  p  (with synergies), bidders with 
C //=  c bid according to the value o f  the synergy and bidders with C// = c - A play mixed 
strategies F// : [c - As, c] [0, 1]. Thus, the bid distributions can be expressed as 
follows:
b(v) = c (V.IO)
= (V. l l )
p ( b - c  + A)
and both bidders continue in the second auction as in Proposition 1.
In case the incumbent does not observe competitive advantages ( 0  < cr< p  < 1), 
the bidding patterns o f incumbents and contestants in the second auction are nearly 
identical. The bidders' strategies and payoffs are as they are in Proposition 1. other than 
a  and p, with the contestant and incumbent bidders exchanging places. Therefore, 
bidders with Cn = c bid their value and bidders with C //= c - A play mixed strategies Fn  : 
[c - A, c]->  [0, 1]. Thus, the bid distributions can be expressed as follows:
F  (6 ) = 1 -  —— — —  (contestant bidder with C = c - zl) (V.6 ’)
' c r ( b - c  + A)
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F^.{b) = \ - ^ ^ — — — - — — —  (incumbent bidder with C =  c - zl). (V .7’)
p(b  -  c + A)
In sum, one can assume that, in the first auction, bidders with high costs will bid c 
and bidders with low costs will submit a bid drawn from the distribution presented in 
equation (11), which is lower than c. Thus, the low-value bidder will win the project 
since the analysis is for first-price sealed-bid construction contracts. In subsequent 
auctions, an incumbent (or contestant) with potential synergies or with competitive 
advantages (or no advantages), and with a low valuation o f c - zl, will submit a bid from 
the distribution presented by equation-V.7 (V.6 ')  and win the project. Any bidder with a 
high valuation o f c will not win the project. It is easy to establish that incumbents with 
synergies or with economic advantages bid more aggressively than contestants. From 
equations (V.6 ) and (V.7), one can establish that the cost distribution o f a contestant 
stochastically dominates the distribution o f an incumbent. Fi (6 ) > Fc (b). This essay 
constructs synergy and competitive advantage variables to support the above theory, and 
empirical results supporting the above claims are presented in Section V.5.
V.4. Data
The data used in this analysis comprises information on all road construction 
projects auctioned by the ODOT from January 1997 to August 2000."* ‘ Projects are 
auctioned off once each month, in two sessions, in a first-price sealed-bid format. Major 
projects are auctioned off, like road construction and paving, traffic signaling, bridge
■“  S ince I investigate synergies derived  from  d iv isional effects, sta tew ide pro jects are excluded  (3 auctions).
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construction and maintenance, as well as minor projects like drainage and clearance/" 
The state reserves the right to reject any bid that is seven percent above the state’s 
engineering cost estimate for the project, but there have been some exceptions to this rule 
mostly due to the underestimation o f costs by the state. Generally, bidders must be pre­
qualified to participate in these auctions. Pre-qualification involves bidders’ submission 
o f certified financial statements to ODOT and is related to the level o f working capital 
available to the potential bidder as well as its history o f successful completion o f  projects. 
The resultant evaluation is used to determine the size o f projects a firm can bid on. Firms 
can be disqualified at any time if  they fail to complete contracts successfully. Finally, 
bidders must make a down payment o f five percent o f the project’s value when 
submitting a bid."*^
The data examined in this study includes descriptions o f “p l^ 'h o ld e rs” (firms 
that purchase project plans), all bids for the project, and the winning bid (if the contract is 
awarded). The state also provides the location o f each project, a description (e.g.. bridge 
construction, asphalt paving, etc.). relevant details (e.g., the length and depth o f the 
paving surface, the type o f material to be utilized, the amount o f  excavation, etc.). 
duration (calendar days), and the total engineering estimate. Table 1 provides summary 
statistics on the number o f auctions, the average number o f plan-holders per auction, and 
the average number o f bidders per auction. During the period under study, there were 
1734 auctions, with an average o f 5.5 plan-holders and 3.3 bidders per auction. Contracts
H ighw ay construction  auctions have been exam ined in a n um ber o f  papers including T hiel ( 1988). Porter 
and Z ona  (1993), Jo fre-B onet and  Pesendorfer (2000) and B ajari (2000). But they do  no t investigate  the 
b idder behav io r due to synergies.
"  In general, these requ irem en ts establish som e barriers for firm s to  extract synergies. F irm s m y have an 
ongoing  project in an a rea  but due to p re-qualification  requ irem ents firm s m ay not be ab le  to  bid on 
upcom ing  pro jects even though they  can realize synergies from  it.
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were awarded in 1409 o f the 1734 auctions. A total o f 284 different firms held project 
plans, 213 bid on projects, and 144 won contracts.'*'*
ODOT has divided Oklahoma into eight divisions (Figure 1).*  ^ Most o f the 
projects under study were located in Division 4 (278)."*  ^ Most firms (49 out o f  284) were 
also located in Division 4 and bid 2286 times, winning 612 projects. Table 2 shows the 
bid frequency by firm division and by project division. One can see that out-of-state 
firms (firm division = 0) bid all across Oklahoma. Their bid frequency on projects ranges 
from 6 .8  percent (38 bids) in Division 2 to 20.7 percent (112 bids) in Division 8 . Further, 
they account for 15.34 percent o f  all projects in Division 1. Table 2 reveals that firms in 
Oklahoma have strong regional preferences, with firms located in a certain division 
tending to bid on projects in their own division. For example. 32.49 percent o f  all the 
bids submitted by firms in Division 1 were submitted to projects in that division. Further, 
compared with other firm divisions. 28.29 percent o f  projects in Division 1 were 
submitted by firms in that division. This pattern can be observed for all project types.
V.5. Empirical Analysis
In this section, I model the differences in bidding due to synergies in spatially 
correlated auctions and utilize a simple reduced-form model o f bidding in spatially 
correlated procurement auctions. Three dependent variables that summarize the 
participation and bidding patterns in these auctions are examined: 1) probability o f 
bidding, 2) probability o f winning conditional upon bidding, and 3) log o f  the bid. The 
independent variables that control for project characteristics are: 1) a set o f dummy
T here are  several firm s in o u r da ta  sets that purchase plans, b id  and w in  frequently . T he  m axim um  
num ber o f  b ids w e observe  by one firm  is 218  and the m axim um  num ber o f  w ins by  a firm  is 59 w ins.
45 T here are  77 counties in O klahom a an d  O D O T  has divided them  into e igh t d iv isions.
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variables for project types (Pj's), 2) the state’s estimate o f  the engineering cost 
(log(engest)), and 3) the number o f  bidders (Iog(#bidders)). The project types include a 
set o f  six dummy variables: asphalt, clearance and bank protection, bridge work, grading 
and draining, concrete work, and signals and lighting. The omitted group is 
miscellaneous work such as intersection modification, parking lot construction, and 
landscaping. The engineering cost estimates are constructed by the state by pricing each 
feature outlined in the design and then deriving an overall cost estimate for the project. 
While the engineering cost estimate should control for project-specific differences in 
cost, certain project classes have different pre-qualification standards. Hence, the pool o f 
potential bidders may differ somewhat across project types. With respect to information 
on the level o f  competitiveness in an auction, the study includes a variable to measure 
competition. As is standard in the auction literature, this study also controls for the 
number o f bidders (log(#bidders)).
With respect to bidders’ own characteristics, four measures are included in the 
regressions. The study categorizes incumbents and contestants into four different groups 
identified by three dummy variables: 1) incumbent bidders bidding in their own 
division’*^  (dincumbent), 2) incumbent bidders bidding in different divisions'** 
(ndincumbent), 3) contestant bidders bidding in their own division (dcontestant). and 4) 
the omitted group— contestant bidders bidding in different divisions (ndcontestant). In 
the period under study, incumbent bidders bidding in their own division make up about
It is w orthw hile  to  m en tion ing  th a t O k lahom a C ity, the largest city in S tate o f  O k lahom a is located  in this 
div ision .
■*’ In th is case the f irm ’s location  and  p ro jec t location are in the sam e div ision . F or exam ple  a firm  in 
D ivision-4  that has w on  a p ro jec t in D ivision-4  and  is b idding in D ivision-4  in subsequen t auctions.
T he  d ifferen t d iv isions a re  iden tified  as d iv isions o ther than the ir ow n d iv ision  w here they  have an on 
go ing  project. F or exam ple  a  firm  in D iv ision-4  tha t has w on a  project in D iv ision-2  and  is b idd ing  in
D ivision-2  in subsequen t auctions.
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19.87 percent o f  plan-holders and 22.31 percent o f bidders. Out o f the 9526 plans 
purchased in that period, incumbent bidders bidding in their own division purchase 1893 
plans and, eventually, submit 1165 bids. Out o f the 1734 auctions under study. 778 
contain incumbents bidding in their own division"*^ who won 399 projects (Table 1).
Next, the study includes a variable that accounts for past success in auctions 
(wbratio). This variable is constructed as the ratio of the past number o f wins to the past 
number o f bids. It provides information on the previous success o f  a firm and is included 
to control for differences in firm efficiencies. In addition to the synergy variables, a 
backlog variable is constructed. For each firm, the average monthly value o f every 
contract won is calculated. Each subsequent month, the average monthly value is 
subtracted from the remaining portion o f the contract until the completion o f the project. 
Thus, the total remaining value o f the projects that a firm has undertaken can be 
calculated at any given point in time. Backlog^" variable is used to control for firms' 
capacity constraints.
Theoretical predictions indicate that incumbents bid aggressively when they 
observe synergies. Therefore, the study expects the following empirical results. First, 
incumbents bidding in their own region will have a higher probability to bid, will have a 
higher probability to win conditional upon bidding, and will bid more aggressively 
compared to any other bidder since they gain from both synergies and competitive 
advantages associated with their familiarity with local market resources. Second, 
contestants will have a low probability to bid and to win conditional upon bidding, and
Incum bents b idd ing  in d iffe ren t d iv isions w ere present in 208 auctions, con testan ts b idd ing  in th e ir ow n 
d iv ision  w ere presen t in 459 auctions, and  contestan ts b idding in d ifferen t ac tions w ere p resen t in 1610 
auctions.
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will bid less aggressively regardless o f whether they bid in their own division or not. 
Third, efficient firms will have a higher probability to bid and win and will bid 
aggressively and, therefore, the coefficient o f the wbratio should indicate a negative sign. 
Finally, firms with low capacity constraints (high backlog) will bid less aggressively. 
Bidding behaviors are analyzed using probits, ordinary least squares (OLS), and standard 
panel data techniques.^' Thus, the basic structure o f the empirical model is as follows:
6
y, = /^o + X  + A  ^ogiengest, ) + /?g log(# bidders, ) + {dincumbent, )
;=i
+ {ndincumbent, ) + {dcontestant, ) + /?,; \og{backlog, ) (V. 12)
+ Pu{wbratio,) + e ,^
As discussed earlier, interdependencies among projects and geographic areas may 
lead to spatial correlation among bids. If one observes spatial heterogeneity in a model, 
the estimation o f that model with simple probits, OLS, and fixed effects will result in 
inefficient estimators. Therefore, this study will use spatial econometric techniques to 
analyze bidding behavior. There has been very little research on spatial models in 
auction markets^' and this research affords new insights into procurement auction 
markets with spatial properties. O f the numerous spatial models available, this study 
utilizes the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial probit method and the Gibbs
T he study uses the log o f  the backlog. T he log o f  backlog is calculated  as follow s: Ibacklog = 
log(6acW og+ 1 ).
T he study w ill use fixed effec ts  m odel to analyze the w ithin firm  bidding behavior.
A usubel et al (1997) show  th a t there  are geographic  synergies associated  w ith  w inn ing  m u ltip le  PCS 
licenses. R usco and W alls (1999) have show n spatial correlation  in tim ber m arke t auctions. Further, Porter 
and  Z ona  (1999), in their study  o f  b idd ing  by  dairies fo r contracts to supply  m ilk , and  B ajari (2001), in his 
s tudy  o f  b idd ing  by h ighw ay construction  firm s for p rocurem ent contracts, have  also show n th a t location 
p lays a  m ajor role in firm ’s b idd ing  behavior.
M ethods proposed  to estim ate  spatial m odels and  applied  stud ies are spatial p rob it e rro r m odels 
(M cM illen  1992), LeSage (2000), and  LeSage and  Sm ith (2000), generalized  estim ations o f  the p robit 
(P inske  and  S lade 1998), genera lized  m ethod  o f  m om ents by LaSage (1999a, 1999b), K elejian  and  P rucha 
1998, 1999), and Bell and  B ockstael (2000), and sim ulated  recursive sam pling  (V ijverberg  1997). For 
rev iew s see A nselin  and  F lorax  (1995).
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Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial regression method introduced by LeSage 
(1999a, 1999b).^
There are numerous advantages to using the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian 
heteroscedastic spatial regression and probit methods (LeSage 1999a). First, this method, 
unlike others, allows for the assumption o f  non-constant variance for each region, 
resulting in efficient estimators. This can be easily explained by analyzing the structure 
o f  the error term. The random error vector, u, takes the following form: u = ÂfVu + 
s, where A is a scalar parameter that indicates the magnitude o f spatial correlation among 
projects and fF is a known nxn  spatial weight matrix generally constructed by using 
latitude and longitude coordinates, as in this essay. The random error vector. & is an « x / 
vector with a non-constant variance taking on different values for specific regions. Other 
methods, however, assume that there is a constant variance for all regions, meaning that 
there is no heterogeneity due to regions.
Second, unlike other methods, the Gibbs Sampling approach constructs complete 
conditional distributions for all the parameters in the model that converge in the limit to 
their true distributions o f  the parameters. This technique allows for constructing efficient 
estimators.
The third advantage is that in the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic 
spatial probit methods, unlike in other methods, one does not have to specify a functional 
form for the random error term, s. This would be impractical for large models when 
specifying the functional form and the variables involved in the models for variance o f 
the error term. The basic idea o f  the Gibbs sampling is to create a large random sample
See the append ix  for a  b r ie f  technical explanation .
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o f observations for the posterior density o f parameters to be estimated, and then to 
approximate the shape o f these probability d e n s it ie s .L e S a g e  (1999a p.87) explains the 
Gibbs sampling steps in detail.
First, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) error test is used to test for spatial correlation. 
The null hypothesis o f the LM test is that there is no spatial correlation in the models. 
The application o f the LM test to the data set demonstrates that the model fits a Spatial 
Error ModeL in which the error terms exhibit spatial dependence.'^ The observed LM 
values and corresponding probabilities are given in Table 4. This further justifies the 
existence o f spatial correlations in this auction market. In this case, this essay utilizes the 
Gihbs Sampling Bayesian Heteroscedastic Spatial Error Model to analyze the data. See 
appendix (V.7.) for a brief description o f  the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian Heteroscedastic 
Spatial Regression/Probit Models.
Next, the study estimates probit models for bid submission. The first column in 
Table 5 reveals that incumbent bidders bidding in their own division are most likely to 
submit a bid. Further, incumbents bidding in different divisions and contestants bidding 
in their own division are also more likely to submit a bid compared to contestants bidding 
in different divisions. Firm efficiencies are captured by the past wins-to-bid ratio and this 
shows that efficient firms are more likely to submit bids. Therefore, the results are in 
accordance with the predictions o f this study. Column 2 o f  Table 5 shows the Gibbs 
Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial probit results. The spatial probit results are 
also significant and consistent with the hypothesis. The most important point is that the 7.
”  K ernel density  functions can be used to approxim ate these distributions.
T here  are  th ree  basic spatial m odels: 1) General Spatial ModeL w hich inc ludes both the spatia l lagged 
term  as w ell as a  spatially  corre la ted  error structure , 2 ) Mixed Autoregressive-regressive Model, in w hich
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parameter is significant. This indicates that projects are geographically correlated and, as 
the distance increases, the spatial correlation decreases. Both models show that bidders 
with synergies are more likely to bid than those with no competitive advantages.
The first column o f Table 6 shows results for the probability o f  winning 
conditional upon bidding using a general probit model. The results indicate that 
incumbents bidding in their own division are more likely to win than any other bidder. 
Incumbents bidding in different divisions are also likely to win, but less than incumbents 
who are winning in their own divisions, compared to contestants winning conditional 
upon bidding in their own divisions and contestants winning conditional upon bidding in 
different divisions. There is no statistical difference between contestants winning 
conditional upon bidding in their own divisions compared to contestants winning 
conditional upon bidding in different divisions. As expected, efficient firms are more 
likely to win. In addition, capacity constrained bidders are less likely to win than 
capacity unconstrained bidders. Spatially adjusted probit results indicate that X is 
insignificant. Both models show that bidders with synergies and competitive advantages 
are more likely to win conditional on bidding than those with no competitive advantages.
Table 7 presents the next set o f regression results using an OLS model with 
White-corrected standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity (column 1) and Gibbs 
Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial error models (column 2). In OLS and 
spatially adjusted models, the results indicate that incumbents bidding in their own 
division or in different divisions bid more aggressively than any other bidder. This again 
supports the hypothesis that bidders who realize synergies will bid more aggressively. In
the  standard  regression m odel is com bined w ith a  spatially lagged dependen t variab le , and  3) Spatial Error 
Model. LeSage (1999a) defines these spatial m odels in detail in Spatial E conom etrics.
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addition, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer's (2000) claim— that capacity-constrained bidders 
are less likely to bid than capacity-unconstrained bidders— is supported.
Finally, the study uses a fixed-effects model to analyze the data. To observe 
within-firm effects, only firms with multiple bids have been used. In the fixed-effects 
models, the wbratio is excluded because the backlog variable is used to capture bidder 
efficiency due to capacity constraints over time. Further, a firm may bid as an incumbent 
in its own division as well as in a different division, simultaneously. In this case its 
wbratio will be the same. The incumbent and contestant dummies are expected to show 
differences in the aggressiveness o f bids. Again, one should remember that incumbency 
is not permanent. The results indicate that, when a firm is an incumbent and bidding in 
its own division, it bids more aggressively than when it is an incumbent and bidding in a 
different division, or a contestant bidding in its own division or in a different division 
(Table 8). Finally, in all models, the results indicate that, when a firm is capacity 
constrained, it will bid less aggressively than when it has low capacity constraints. In the 
fixed-effects model. X is insignificant, indicating that spatial dependence dissipates when 
looking at wi thin-firm effects.
V.6. Summary
This paper examines the bidding behavior o f firms with synergies in recurring 
spatially correlated road construction procurement auctions held by ODOT from January 
1997 to August 2000. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated and. as the 
distance increases, the correlation dissipates. The theoretical predictions indicate that 
incumbents with synergies will bid more aggressively than contestants. Firms with 
competitive advantages and inherent firm efficiencies will also bid more aggressively.
77
Incumbent bidders bidding in their own divisions with synergies and competitive 
advantages tend to have a high probability o f winning conditional upon bidding than 
other bidders. Firm efficiencies increase the probability o f bidding and winning, and also 
aggressiveness o f  bids. Further, the study shows that capacity constrained bidders bid 
less aggressively. Finally, the study shows that, when considering wi thin-firm effects, 
the results indicate a similar pattern. That is, when a firm is an incumbent bidding in its 
own division, it tends to bid more aggressively than when it is a contestant.
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V. 7. Appendix
A general version o f the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial 
regression model with an informative prior can be written as (LeSage 1999a. p.86):
y  = pWy + XP + ii 
u = XWu
(V.13)
E ~ N {0 ,(j 'V )
V = d iag{v^,v, v„)
where y  contains an nx 1 vector o f cross-sectional dependent variables. The matrix X  
represents an nxk  matrix o f explanatory variables such as explained earlier. The random 
error vector (m) is an mx 1 vector with mean 0 and a non-spherical variance-covariance 
matrix cr~ ( /  - AW)"' ( /  - AW')'‘. The random error vector (£■) is an n x l  vector with an 
expected mean value o f  zero and a non-constant variance ( c r ’ n  taking on different 
values for specific regions. Thus, spatial heterogeneity across ODOT divisions is
assumed in this study. The magnitudes v,. / -  1.......  n represent parameters to be
estimated. A normal prior has been placed on the parameter /3 (mean c = 0 and variance 
r  = 1 ), and an undetermined prior mean o f ^  and an undetermined prior variance do are 
prior parameters for cr. The relative variance terms (vi. vi v„) are assumed to be fixed
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but unknown parameters that need to be estimated in addition to n param eters/^ The 
prior distribution o f  the v, terms takes the form o f an independent %"(r)/r distribution, 
where this distribution is a single parameter distribution represented as and r  ~ V{m, 
k). W is a. known nxn  spatial weight matrix, usually containing first-order contiguity 
relations or functions o f distance, and p  and À are scalar parameters to be estimated, 
where p  and / are undetermined prior parameters for p  and X respectively. The 
parameter, T, is a coefficient on the spatially correlated errors that shows the magnitude 
o f  spatial correlation among projects. Note that, when p  is insignificant, the General 
Spatial Model collapses to a Spatial Error Model (SEM) and, when À is insignificant, it 
collapses into a Mixed Autoregressive Model (SAR) (LeSage 1999a). In this study, 
latitude and longitude coordinates have been used to construct a contiguity matrix when 
estimating data. These latitude and longitude coordinates indicate each coimty seat. 
ODOT also uses county seats to calculate distance between counties. Since ODOT 
indicates the project location by county, these latitude and longitude coordinates are used 
to identify the project locations and to construct the W  matrix, as indicated above.
One o f the problems that Bayesian regressions face is in deriving a posterior 
distribution for parameters to be estimated. This problem can be overcome by using a 
Gibbs sampling p ro c e d u re .T h e  basic idea o f the Gibbs sampling procedure is to create 
a large random sample o f observations from the posterior density o f  parameters to be
”  L eS age (1999a) says that, estim ating  n param eters, v,. v j v„, in add ition  to  the  *+ l param eters, p. and
cr using  n data  observations is no t a  problem  from  a degrees o f  freedom  perspec tive  because, B ayesian 
m ethods rely on an in form ative p rio r for the param eters.
T his add itional param eter, r , a llow s us to  estim ate the additional n v, param eters in the m odel. N ote that 
as r  becom es very  large, the term s r/Vj w ill all approach unity, resu lting  in hom oscedastic  ( F  =  /„) error 
term s. Then th is m eans that w e start w ith  a  p rio r b e lie f  that the variance  is co n stan t over all regions 
(L eS age 1999a).
”  T h is m ethod  is also called  as the  M arkov C hain M onte C arlo p rocedure.
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estimated and, then, to approximate the shape o f  these probability densities.^® LeSage 
(1999a p.87) explains the Gibbs sampling steps in detail.
When p  is insignificant, the General Spatial Model collapses to a Spatial Error 
Model (SEM). In this case, the Gibbs Sampling Bayesian Heteroscedastic Spatial Error 
Model will take the following form:
y  =  X p  +  u 
u =  AW +  e
(V.14)
e ~ N ( 0 , c r - V )
V =  t / / a ^ ( v , , v , , . . . , v „ ) .
When considering probit models with heteroscedasticity, it is important to 
account for the heteroscedasticity because, if  one assumes that errors are homoscedastic, 
the estimator will be inconsistent. LeSage (1999a, 2000) and LeSage and Smith (2000) 
introduce a Gibbs sampling Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial probit models that accounts 
for heteroscedasticity. LeSage (1999a) notes that evaluating likelihood functions for 
heteroscedastic spatial models is impractical.^' Estimating with M cM illen's (1992) 
approach also results in biased estimators. The Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial probit 
model overcomes these problems, and the basic idea o f this model is as follows. Using 
the Gibbs sampling approach, one can construct a conditional distribution for the 
censored or latent observations conditional on all other parameters in the model. In the
“  K ernel density  functions can  be used  to approxim ate these d istribu tions.
The m odel con tains a n u m b er o f  in tegrals tha t equal to  the num ber o f  observations.
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case o f  a probit model, this distribution is used to produce a random draw for all yi in the 
model. This conditional distribution for the latent variables takes the form o f a normal 
distribution centered on the predicted value truncated by 0 from the left for y. = 1 and 
truncated by 0 from the right y, = 0. This process ensures the predicted values to be 
between (0,1) interval. Then, LeSage (1999a, 2000) and LeSage and Smith (2000) note 
that, when one has a random normal sample for the unobserved latent variable, the model 
becomes a Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial regression model (as presented earlier) and 
all parameters and conditional distributions stay valid. Therefore, one can view this as a 
Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial error model with a binary dependent variable.
In this study, a latent but unobservable variable^" is z, such that values o f z, < 0 
produce observed variables, y/ = 1 and z, > 0, resulting in y, = 0. Therefore, we can 
formally sate that the conditional probability ofz/. given all other parameters, is:
N {y , , cr ,^ ), truncated at the left by 0 if y, = 1 
N {y , , CT^ , ), truncated at the right by 0 if  y, = 0
where the predicted value for Zi is denoted by y, which represents the /th row o f y  = X/3 
for the SEM. The variance o f the prediction is co  ^ . where %  denotes the //th
element o f (/„ - p  PF)"'^.
T he latent variable can  be defined  as follow s: firms do not observe th e ir true cost fo r a  p ro jec t bu t know s 
the ir th resho ld  cost, c*, fo r each  project. T herefore , w e can se t that w hen considering  the  p robab ility  o f  
b idding, w hen  a f irm 's  co st is less than o r equal to c '  then they  w ill subm it a b id , w here y  = 1. W hen 
considering  the p robab ility  o f  w inn ing  conditional upon b idd ing , la ten t variab le  is se t equal to  the  low est 
cost.
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Table-V.l: Summary Statistics of Oklahoma Road Construction Auctions
V a ria b le A uction  S ta tis tic s
N um ber o f  A uctions 1734
N um ber o f  A uctions w / W inners 1409
N um ber o f  
Firm s
284
N um ber o f  Plans Purchased 9526
N um ber o f  
Bids
5221
A verage N um ber o f  
Plan holders per A uction
5.5305
(3 .0578)
A verage N um ber o f  B idders per A uction 3.3026
(1 .6843)
N um ber o f  Incum bent Plan H olders in their 
O w n D ivision
1893
N um ber o f  Incum bent Plan H olders in 
D ifferen t D ivisions
4516
N um ber o f  C ontestan t Plan H olders in their 
O w n D ivision
939
N um ber o f  C ontestan t Plan H olders in 
D ifferent D ivisions
2178
N um ber o f  B ids by Incum bents w ho are 
B idding in th e ir O w n D ivision
1165
N um ber o f  Bids by Incum bents w ho  are 
B idding in D ifferen t D ivisions
2621
N um ber o f  B ids by C ontestan ts w ho are 
B idding in the ir O w n D ivision
492
N um ber o f  B ids by C ontestants w ho are 
B idding in D ifferen t D ivisions
943
N um ber o f  Incum bent W inners in their 
O w n D ivision
399
N um ber o f  Incum bent W inners in 
D ifferen t D ivisions
658
N um ber o f  C on testan t W inners in their 
O w n D ivision
135
N um ber o f  C ontestan t W inners in 
D ifferent D ivisions
217
N ote: S tandard  D eviations are in parentheses.
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Figure-V.l: ODOT Field Divisions
KANSAS
TEXAS
OKLAHOMA
xficnoa
ODOT 
Field D ivisions
TEXAS
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Table-v.2: Bid Frequencies by Firm Division and Project Division
Frequency 
Percent 
Row % 
Col. %
rm id iv - l P rojdiv-2 Projdiv-3 P nijd iv-4 Projdiv-S Pnijd iv-6 Projd iv-7 Pro jd iv -8 T otal
Firm div4) 77 38 69 105 40 74 43 112 55,8
1.47 0.73 1.32 2.01 0.77 1.42 0.82 2.15 10 69
13.80 6.81 12.37 18.82 7.17 13.26 7.71 20.07
15.34 9.18 7.36 9.84 7.49 21.20 6.78 14.29
R rm d iv -l 142 69 69 42 9 7 14 85 4 3 -
2.72 1.32 1.32 0.80 0.17 0.13 0.27 1.63 .8 3 -
32.49 15.79 15.79 961 2.06 1.60 3.20 19.45
28.29 16.67 7.36 3.94 1.69 2.01 2.21 10.84
F inndiv-2 26 89 51 4 0 0 4 196
0.50 1.70 0.98 0 08 0.00 0.00 0 4 2 0.08 3 -5
13.27 45 41 26.02 2.04 0.00 0.00 11.22 2.04
5 18 21.50 5.44 0.37 0.00 0 0 0 3.47 0.51
Kirmdiv-3 7 1 81 26 63 44 39 1 262
0.13 0.02 1.55 0.50 1.21 0.84 0.75 0 0 2 5 02
2.57 0.38 30.92 9.92 24.05 16.79 14 89 0.38
1.39 0.24 8.64 2.44 11.80 12.61 6.15 0.13
F im idiv-» 124 140 487 704 228 113 285 205 2256
2.38 2.68 9.33 13.48 4.37 2.16 5.46 3.93 43 -.8
5.42 6.12 21.30 30.80 9.97 4.94 12.47 8.97
24.70 33.82 51.97 65.98 42.70 32.38 44 95 26.15
Firm div-5 3 2 25 30 101 56 35 7 259
0.06 0.04 0.48 0.57 1 93 1 07 0.67 0 13 4 96
1.16 0,77 9.65 11.58 39.00 21.62 13 51 2.70
0.60 0.48 2.67 2.81 18.91 16.05 5.52 0.89
Firm div .6 0 1 0 0 3 28 0 0 32
0 0 0 00 2 0.00 0 0 0 0.06 0.54 0.00 0 0 0 0 61
0 0 0 .3.13 0 00 0.00 9.38 87 50 0 00 0 00
0,00 0 24 0 00 0.00 0.56 8.02 0.00 0 00
Finndiv-7 9 19 53 .35 65 13 147 5 346
0 17 03 6 1.02 0.67 1 24 0.25 2.82 0 10 6 63
2.60 5 49 15 32 10.12 18.79 3.76 42 49 1 45
1 79 5.49 5.(i6 3.28 12.17 3 72 23.19 0 64
Ftrm divqi 114 55 102 121 25 14 49 365 545
2.18 1.05 1 95 2.32 0 4 8 0.27 0.94 6.99 16 15
13,49 5.51 12.07 14.32 2.96 1.66 5 80 43.20
22.71 13 29 10.89 11.34 4 68 401 7.73 46 56
Total 5u: 93 - 1116- 534 349 634 S 4 5221
9 6 : -9 3 r  95 20 44 10 23 6 6.S 12 14 15 02 100 00
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Table-v.3: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
V a ria b le M ean
(S tandard  D eviation)
Log o f  B ids 12.8824
(1 .5899)
Log o f  W inning Bids 12.6465
(1 .5981)
Log o f  E ng ineer’s E stim ate 13.0738
(1 .6957)
Log o f  N um ber o f  B idders in an A uction 1.2400
(0 .473)
Probability  o f  facing an incum bent w ho is bidding in h is own division. 0.2231
(0 .4164)
Probability  o f  facing an incum bent w ho  is bidding in a d ifferent d ivision. 0 .5020
(0 .5000)
P robability  o f  facing a  con testan t w ho is b idding in his ow n division. 0 .0942
(0 .2922)
Probability  o f  facing a con testan t w ho is b idding in a different division. 0 .1806
(0 .3847)
L og o f  F irm ’s B acklog 9.7314
(6 .6558)
F irm ’s W inning to  B idding Ratio 0 .2317
(0 .1724)
N ote: S tandard  D eviations are  in parentheses.
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Tab le-v.4: Spatial Dependence Test Statistics
M odel T e s t S ta tis tic s
Spatial Error Model 
LM  value 7.237
P robability 0.0071
Mixed Autoregressive Model 
LM  value 0.0148
Probability 0 .9032
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Table-V.5: Probit Results for Probability of Bidding
Variable Unadjusted fo r  Spatial 
Correlation
Adjusted fo r  Spatial 
Correlation
Constant 1.1705* 1.3067*
(0 .1686) (0 .1877)
Project-1 0.1015 0.1137
(0 .0693) (0 .0736)
Project-2 -0 .0750 -0.0583
(0 .0994) (0 .1106)
Project-3 -0 .0244 0.0196
(0 .0669) (0 .0697)
Project-4 -0 .2138* -0.2316*
(0 .0749) (0 .0777)
Project-5 -0 .0018 0.0127
(0 .1542) (0 .1671)
Project-6 0 .4524* 0.4983*
(0 .0923) (0 .1035)
Log o f  Engineer‘s Estimate -0 .1013* -0.1134*
(0 .0121) (0 .133)
Log o f  Firm's Backlog -0 .0082 -0.0082
(0 .0053) (0 .0060)
Firm's Winning to Bidding Ratio 0.3630* 0.4274*
(0 .0888) (0 .0964)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in his 0.5736* 0.6200*
Own Division (0 .0833) (0 .0946)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in a 0.5197* 0.5623*
Different Division (0 .0807) (0 .0895)
A Contestant who is Bidding in his 0 .2090* 0.2341*
Own Division (0 .0516) (0 .0550)
A 0.2864*
(0.1412)
N um . o f  O bs. 8954 8954
L R  r 654.65
N o te : S ta n d a rd  D e v ia tio n s  a re  in p a re n th e se s . * D e n o te s  9 5 %  sta tis tica l s ig n if ic a n c e .
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Table-V.6: Probit Results for Probability of Winning
Variable Unadjustedfor Spatial Adjusted fo r  Spatial 
Correlation Correlation
Constant -0 .5384* -0.5883
(0 .2342) (0 .2590)
P roject-! 0.2158* 0.2445*
(0 .0926) (0 .1026)
Project-2 -0 .1847 -0 .2406
(0 .1380) (0 .1651)
Project-3 0.0054 0.0040
(0 .0904) (0 .1008)
Project-4 0.0613 0.0660
(0 .1064) (0 .1197)
Project-5 -0 .0715 -0 .1168
(0 .2123) (0 .2682)
Project-6 0 .0218 0.0187
(0 .1105) (0 .1183)
Log o f  Engineer's Estimate -Ü.U292 -0 .0340*
(0 .0171) (0 .0197)
Log o f  Firm's Backlog -0 .0344* -0.0378*
(0 .0064) (0 .0075)
Firm's Winning to Bidding Ratio 0.7547* 0.8482*
(0.1216) (0 .1409)
.■In Incumbent who is Bidding in his 0.6636* 0.7392*
Own Division (0 .1030) (0 .1166)
.■in Incumbent who is Bidding 0.4300* 0.4782*
in a  Different Division (0 .0995) (0 .1128)
.4 Contestant who is Bidding in his 0.0931 0.1083
Own Division (0 .0766) (0 .0875)
A 0.2264
(0 .1325)
N um . o f  Obs. 
L R  r
5221
148.68
5221
N o te : S ta n d a rd  D e v ia tio n s  a re  in p a re n th e se s . * D e n o tes  9 5 %  sta tis tica l s ig n if ic a n c e .
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Table-V.7: Regression Results for Log of Bids
Variable OLS Adjusted fo r  Spatial 
Correlation
Constant 0.6370* 0.5583*
(0.0636) (0 .0385)
P reject-! -0 .0472* -0.0276*
(0.0180) (0 .0142)
Project-2 -0.0572 -0 .0104
(0 .0466) (0 .0256)
Project-3 -0 .0705* -0.0416*
(0.0184) (0 .0140)
Project-4 -0.0361 -0 .0240
(0 .0203) (0 .157)
Project-5 0.1094* 0.1230*
(0.0423) (0 .0381)
Project-6 -0.1808* -0.1601*
(0.0225) (0 .0175)
Log o f  Engineer‘s Estimate 0.9643* 0.9700*
(0.0044) (0 .0027)
Log number o f  bidders -0 .0244* -0.0302*
(0.0078) (0 .0058)
Log o f  Firm's Backlog 0.0116* 0.0093*
(0 .0015) (0 .0011)
Firm's Winning to Bidding Ratio -0 .1565* -0.1476*
(0.0263) (0 .0189)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in his -0.1266* -0.1084*
Own Division (0 .0244) (0 .0171)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in a -0.1116* -0.0942*
Dijferent Division (0 .0245) (0 .0169)
A Contestant who is Bidding in his 0.0002 -0 .0074
Own Division (0 .0168) (0 .0113)
A 0.2857*
(0 .0866)
N um . o f  O bs. 
R-
5221
0.9731
5221
0 .9886
N ote: H eteroscedasticity  co rrected  standard  erro rs are  in parentheses. * D enotes 95%  statistical 
sign ificance.
9 0
Table-V.8: Fixed Effects Regression Results for Log of Bids
Variable Unadjusted fo r  Spatial 
Correlation
Adjusted f o r  Spatial 
Correlation
Constant 0.8146* -0.0005
(0 .0478) (0 .0027 )
Project-! -0 .0468* -0.0256*
(0.0187) (0 .0149)
Project-2 -0 .0154 -0 .0230
(0 .0279) (0 .0258)
Project-3 -0 .0146 -0 .0084
(0 .0196) (0 .0160)
Project-4 0.0082 0.0114
(0 .0204) (0 .0156)
Project-5 0.1131* 0.1615*
(0 .0402) (0 .0366)
Project-6 -0.0441 -0 .0344
(0 .0328) (0 .0269)
Log o f  Engineer's 0.9461* 0.9546*
Estimate (0 .0035) (0 .0029)
Log number o f  bidders -0 .0287* -0.0279*
(0 .0079) (0 .0059)
Log o f  Firm's Backlog 0.0048* 0.0042*
(0 .0013) (0 .0100)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in his -0 .0694* -0.0536*
Own Division (0 .0206) (0 .0154)
An Incumbent who is Bidding in a -0 .0424* -0 .0380*
Dijferent Division (0 .0198) (0 .0151)
A Contestant who is Bidding in his -0 .0160 -0 .0178
Own Division (0 .0157) (0 .0123)
À 0.1917
(0 .0964)
N um . o f  O bs. 5161 5161
R- 0.9725 0 .9810
N o te : S ta n d a rd  D e v ia tio n s  a re  in p a re n th e se s . •  D e n o te s  9 5 %  sta tis tica l s ig n if ic a n c e .
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
VI. 1. Introduction
Auction theory has increasingly come to be regarded as important for practical, 
empirical, and theoretical reasons. The ODOT awards its road construction contracts by 
procurement auctions. The objective o f this study was to empirically investigate bidder 
behavior in procurement auctions due to asymmetries. Bidder asymmetry was defined 
and bidding behavior analyzed in three separate chapters. Road construction contract 
auctions held by ODOT from January 1997 to August 2000 provided the data for this 
empirical investigation.
The first essay, “An Empirical Analysis o f Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in 
Road Construction Auctions,” examined the patterns o f bidding by incumbent and entrant 
firms in road construction procurement auctions. The study found that entrant bidders 
bid more aggressively, win with lower bids, and leave more money on the table than 
incumbent bidders. On a theoretical level, the study considered an asymmetric model o f 
auctions with emphasis on the characteristics o f these groups, and produced testable 
predictions. In particular when the distribution o f an entrant's costs exhibits greater 
dispersion than that o f  an incumbent’s, the entrant with a low cost estimate will bid more 
aggressively relative to the engineering estimate than the incumbent. I found that bidders 
who have a history o f  past winning in auctions have a tendency to bid lower, but do not 
win with overly aggressive bids, and do not leave money on the table. The study also
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found that rival bidder characteristics affect bidding behavior. The tougher the average
rival is in an auction, the lower the bid and the lower the winning bid.
The second essay, “Sequential Bidding in Road Construction Auctions,” suggests
that, on average, those firms that lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively in the
afternoon, relative to their morning bid, than those firms that won at least one project.
The winners o f early auctions are typically stronger bidders and, conditional on the
outcome o f early auctions, the weak bidders (i.e., morning losers) adjust their strategies
#
and bid more aggressively in afternoon auctions. In addition, fixed-effects results suggest 
that the more competitive the set o f rivals a firm faces, the more aggressively the firm 
bids.
The final essay, “ Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical 
Investigation,” reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with synergies 
participate in procurement auctions, their probability o f bidding and winning increases 
and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity 
unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained.
VI.2. Limitations
The limitations o f the study arise from the data that forms the basis o f this 
empirical investigation. With a limited data set, it was not possible to observe large 
numbers o f entrants in the first essay. First, we have few entrants that bid multiple times. 
Since we have very few observations on entrant firms, we cannot use a fixed-effects 
model to examine within-firm effects. Examining data beyond August 2000 and 
observing more entrant bidders could overcome this problem.
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Next, a fixed window was used to create histories. Some firms may enter and exit 
during that period or a firm may become inefficient and not bid or win as frequently as it 
used to. Updating the history throughout the sample was one attempt at overcoming this 
constraint, but using a rolling window could be a better measure. The ad hoc definition 
o f entry used in this study is not theoretically backed. However, Dunne et al (1989) have 
used this kind o f  specification. In Chapters IV and V the backlog variable was used to 
measure capacity constraints. However, this variable actually shows the current 
workload rather than a firm’s maximum capacity.
Further, bidders may have bid in auctions other than those o f  ODOT, which may 
have affected their capacity constraints. However, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (1999. 
2000) have used a similar backlog variable to measure capacity constraints. Finally, in 
Chapter V, the spatial results are not significantly different from OLS results, but are a 
good robustness check for OLS results.
VI.3. Implications for Future Research
Future studies could investigate what factors influence a firm to submit a bid. the 
influence on bidding behavior when firms submit multiple bids simultaneously to gain 
from complementarities, and the influence on bidding behavior o f  minority set-aside 
programs. The above issues could also be investigated using ODOT data. These studies 
would be important contributions to the auction literature since there are not many 
empirical studies focusing on firms’ decisions to enter an auction and on bidder behavior 
due to complementarities and minority set-aside programs. Such studies could provide 
new insights for auction theory that would be useful for governments and bidders.
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VI.4. Conclusion
Overall, this study has shown that bidder asymmetry does affect the bidding 
behavior o f  firms. This information is important for policy-makers as well as for bidders. 
Policy-makers can encourage the participation of new entrants to increase competition 
and reduce the probability o f  collusion. They can achieve this by releasing more 
information about the auction process and characteristics o f project locations. Further, 
they can arrange auctions in sequences that allow firms to gain from synergies that would 
lead to lower bids.
Firms also benefit from an understanding o f the auction process and can gather 
the maximum information about projects before they submit bids. The study reveals that 
new entrants tend to leave more money on the table compared to experienced bidders. 
The sequence o f auctions is also important for firms since they may gain from synergies. 
Therefore, one can say that understanding bidder behavior due to asymmetry is important 
for the auctioneer as well as for the bidder.
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